tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32955927.post1349701122756326815..comments2023-06-18T09:39:06.761+01:00Comments on Intermezzo: Chaplin on Liberalism and Toleration: Part OneRudihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06363041222797819421noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-32955927.post-21528052703655812922007-01-06T22:28:00.000+00:002007-01-06T22:28:00.000+00:00I would like to comment on the original article by...I would like to comment on the original article by Jonathan Chaplin.<br /><br />The basic point I wish to make is that the clarity of his discussion could be improved by distinguishing between tolerance and sphere-sovereign jurisdiction. Apart from the qualifications below I endorse his article whole-heartedly.<br /><br />Jonathan uses a definition of tolerance as a "policy of patient forbearance towards that which is not approved." However, he goes on to discuss what is legitimately within the responsibility of different social spheres to determine for themselves. I think these need to be separated thus:<br /><br />Wider society (or social spheres internally) "tolerate" that which is "not approved" by not acting against those who write/say/do things which are not approved, which lie within the jurisdiction of the relevant social sphere. Otherwise known as "turning a blind eye" - it is not approved but no action is taken against it for whatever reason. There is a legitimate power available which is not exercised. <br /><br />However, there are some issues which lie outside the jurisdiction of the relevant social sphere, and it is inappropriate to use the term "tolerance" to describe attitudes towards them. "Tolerance" implies that something is not approved, we have the power to stop it happening, but for whatever reason we turn a blind eye and do nothing. If something lies outside the competence of a sphere to rule on or act against, the attitude towards it should not be called "tolerance" as this sphere does not need to, and cannot legitimately, officially state approval or dis-approval (although individuals may have their views and may express and act on these legitimately within other spheres), cannot legitimately rule on or act against it, and is not accountable if it does not do something about it.<br /><br />In the issue of religious groups on campus, the Student Association does not "tolerate" different creedal confessions which it disagrees with, as it has no competence to rule on them and is therefore prohibited from legitimately acting against groups which hold views which the Association members (as individuals) hold to be objectionable. They are entitled to have those views as to the objectionable nature of religious creeds, but cannot as an Association formally act against those who hold them. "Toleration" implies a right to act against such views but turning a blind eye instead. <br /><br />There are other issues with "toleration" e.g. whether failing to act against something which is legitimately within the power of a social sphere to control raises concerns about liability and accountability for failing to act when action is required. When does "toleration" move from ignoring a minor departure from norms of no real consequence, to inaction against flagrant corruption? And does the first eventually move to the second through perpetrators "getting away with it"?<br /><br />Perhaps "toleration" is a concept whose day is past, and we should find new ways to talk about our attitudes to that which we do not approve.<br /><br />Chris Gousmett<br />faithact@ihug.co.nzAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com