John Bolt on Reformational Philosophy

Kyle Dillion has written a summary and response to John Bolt's "Doubting Reformational anti-Thomism" a chapter in Aquinas Among the Protestants.

Bolt has also criticised Dooyeweerd in his review "An Adventure in Ecumenicity: A Review Essay of Berkouwer and Catholicism by Eduardo Echeverria". Below is the response I wrote to that piece. It was first published on the now defunct reformational scholarship blog.

John Bolt’s “An Adventure in Ecumenicity” is billed as a review of Berkouwer and Catholicism by Eduardo Echeverria, however, it is both more and less than that. It is less since we do not find out much about Echeverria’s book! Of the 14 pages of the review only three paragraphs actually reference the book and they are largely used to introduce his main target: Herman Dooyeweerd and reformational philosophy (who nevertheless are nowhere directly quoted). It is more since the main purpose of the review, so it appears, is to express the annoyance and dissatisfaction with what he, from his North American context, has experienced as reformational philosophy. And further the rejection of natural theology that first struck him as problematic in his Seminary days of studying Berkouwer (77).

His criticism of Dooyeweerd and reformational philosophy is that they subscribed to “progressive biblicism,” a term he borrows from Valentijn Hepp who had criticised Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven in these terms during the 1930s. For Bolt, this progressive biblicism in its “most gentle and kind” form “gives full respect to the confessions in general but bypasses them on a few key doctrines where it judges to have found a more biblical approach. It appeals to the Bible but does not take very seriously the full tradition of the church on these points, preferring to go its own way. Included among these doctrines are the body/soul duality and the continued existence of the soul after death.” (85). Despite being the most gentle and kind form it nevertheless evinces, according to Bolt, an “individualistic approach to Scripture” (86 quoting Hepp), that lacks “the most basic level of Christian humility” (87). It also falls into “a serious epistemological blunder” in trying to use the Bible to “produce a pure biblical philosophy” (88). This progressive Biblicism produced, in the circle of reformational philosophy, a “Biblicism of infinite regress”.  Bolt describes this over four points. First Kuyper and Bavinck are praised by Dooyeweerd for breaking with certain scholastic tendencies, but secondly this break is considered incomplete and so further criticism and philosophical revision is required. Thirdly Cornelius Van Til repeats the first two moves with respect to Dooyeweerd; praise for his move away from certain philosophical notions but criticism that he has not gone far enough. Finally Dooyeweerd “returns the favour, and the disciples of the two men continue the process ad infinitum, ad nauseum, all in the name of finding the true, biblical or reformational philosophy” (87).

While Bolt has other complaints against Dooyeweerd, such that his interpretation and criticism of Thomas Aquinas (and Catholic thought in general) has been thoroughly invalidated, and that his philosophy is a symptom of a misguided de-hellenizing project, I think the above fairly summarises his main concern in this review.

We shall work backwards through the objections and complaints against Dooyeweerd. So the first thing to say is that nowhere does Dooyeweerd, or any other reformational philosophy, ever claim that they are seeking to establish “the true, biblical or reformational philosophy”. In the preface to his magnum opus De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee translated and revised in the 1950s as A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (NC), Dooyeweerd is emphatic that the Christian Idea of science “is not a matter of a ‘system’ (subject to all the faults and errors of human thought) but rather it concerns the foundation and the root of scientific thought as such” (NC I. viii). Elsewhere he writes, “The first systematic statement of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in my book of that title is truly not meant to be a conclusion. It is a modest first attempt at a systematic Calvinist philosophy” (quoted in Verburg 2015, 252). In 1973 he was asked what reformational philosophy would look like in fifty years time, Dooyeweerd replied “That I don’t know. It is possible that it will have disappeared. And I would not mind that, if it had indeed done its work” (Verburg, 483). The point here is that Dooyeweerd sought to discover the religious root of theoretical thinking to show that an intentionally and integrally Christian philosophy could be possible. He consistently distinguished between this religious root, which is pre-theoretical and is a driving force in our thinking, and the theoretical development of philosophical problems which is fallible and subject to the standards for coherent and meaningful philosophy.

When we understand this purpose we can see that what is essential is the foundation or root of philosophy, and it is here where “something permanent can be achieved” that is “with respect to the actualization of the idea concerning an inner reformation of philosophy” (NC I, ix). This task of “an inner reformation of philosophy” is ongoing and never finished. Does this imply an infinite regress? No, because it is no different from the ongoing task of systematic theology to be submitting itself to the final authority of scripture and to articulate the doctrines of the church afresh for each generation. We can also see that Dooyeweerd was not trying to derive a true philosophy from the Bible as Bolt seems to suggest. Indeed Dooyeweerd wrote, “The divine Word-revelation gives the Christian as little a detailed life- and worldview as a Christian philosophy, yet it gives to both simply their direction from the starting-point in their central basic motive. But this direction is really a radical and integral one, determining everything.” (NC I, 128). It is interesting that Bolt’s solution to the problem of a Christian approach in the sciences is that we should judge whether a particular approach is “consistent with or at odds with biblical teaching” (88). This appears to be a rather external view of the role of religion in science and is a significant step back from how he describes the Roman Catholic view as developed by the nouvelle theologie theologians “who insisted that human reason always operates within a teleology of belief and unbelief” (80).

Nevertheless Bolt seems to want to side-step the question as to whether a doctrine such as the substantiality and immortality of the soul is “consistent with or at odds with biblical teaching” since that could lead to bypassing the confessions on a few key doctrines. Instead Christian thinkers must align themselves “philosophically with the Augustinian/Thomistic tradition of Christian metaphysics” (89) or condemn themselves to the charge of “lacking the most basic level of Christian humility” (87).

(24) Sensory perception

Dooyeweerd explains the modal subject-object relation as a coordination between a subject-function and object-function within the same law-sphere where the subject-function is the active pole and the object-function the passive pole (NC, II 370).  As an example we can point to the objective sensory image of space given on the retina as a result of the impression made by light.  It is an image which is only two-dimensional.  It becomes three-dimensional only in coherence with our total subjective feeling of space which involves not only the space of sight, but also that of touch, and to a certain extent hearing.  This in turn depends on the organic coherence of our sense organs (NC II 373).  In a similar way the modal functions of number, movement, energy and organic life can become objectified in sensory perception, this possibility is guaranteed by the way the modal spheres cohere together in reality.

It is important to note that what is objectified in sensory perception is not fully given to it, number, space etc. are not sensory in character, further what is perceived is not purely an object but also a subject.  This means that, for example, a plant functions actively in the modes of number, space, movement, energy and organic life, and it does so in its own particular way.  Dooyeweerd also gives the example of a biotic subject-object relation of a mother-bird feeding its young.  He uses this to show how such a biotic subject-object relation can itself become the object of sensory perception and so be involved in a sensory subject-object relation (NC, II 374).

A natural event, such as a flood, cannot function actively in the mode of feeling, it cannot perceive anything, but it can be perceived.  This is what is meant by being an object for sensory perception.  Such events can function as objects in all the later modes, so it can have a historical meaning, it can have an economic meaning and so on.  This meaning does not exist “in itself” but only in relation to possible subjective functioning in the aspect concerned, Dooyeweerd explains, “The objective-sensory perceptual image of a flash of lightening, for instance, only exists in relationship to possible subjective perception.  It has no being “in itself,” in abstraction.” (ESL, I 185).  Traditionally a distinction between primary and secondary qualities has been maintained where the mathematical and physical characteristics of a natural phenomenon are held to be in the thing itself whereas the sensory qualities of colour, smell, taste etc. are supposed to exist only for subjective perception and so lack any true ‘objectivity’ (in the sense of mind independent reality).  Dooyeweerd’s approach rejects this completely.  On his view a natural phenomenon functions actively, and so as a subject, in the mathematical and physical aspects of reality. As a subject, it truly possesses a spatial trajectory, it functions actively as a subject within the physical aspect of movement and energy.  It is the sensory qualities that are instead “objective” because related as an object to the active functioning of a subject.  The origin of the traditional view is the supposition that investigation by the special sciences is able to inform us with regard to the true and full reality of a phenomenon.  However Dooyeweerd holds that “the special sciences must in fact begin by abstracting from the concrete data in order to be able to theoretically study a particular aspect of reality which has been chosen as a field of investigation.  The special sciences should never arrogate to themselves the theory of reality.  This lies in principle outside the limits of their competency” (ESL, I. 186).

There is an important difference between the objective retrocipations and the objective anticipation in sensory perception.  The first are simply and directly given, those with normal vision in enough light cannot help but see these features, in the latter case however the features relate to normative aspects of reality as such they require the opening or deepening of the objective perceptual image.  “The normative anticipations in the objective-sensory form of a thing are dependent upon human disclosure; they are not present as a matter of course in the perceptual image itself … but are, rather, presented to human beings as a hidden realm of meaning to be disclosed.” (ESL. I 193)

Reformational philosophy emphasises the relational nature of all that exists. There are no 'things in themselves'. It is a mistake to see a basic relationship between thinking and being, rather 'thinking' is just one function next to and in relationship with others as the logical aspect is just one aspect in connection with all the others. And all aspects are aspects of coherence, both in terms of subject-subject relations and subject-object relations.

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(23) The Subject-object relation

The distinction between a “reality in itself” opposed to “appearances” is as old as philosophy itself.  This is to be expected since theoretical thinking gives us a view of reality quite different from our ordinary experience.  As soon as theory gets going one has to consider how these two views relate.  We exist within the world as an active participant shaping and being shaped by the relationships given to us and into which we enter.  Our experience is not primarily of isolated objects or dimensions but of an indissoluble coherence of a rich variety of facets which impress themselves on us, or recede from our consciousness depending on our concerns and interests at each moment.  First the ray of sunlight, or the sound of an alarm clock, that wakes us from sleep, our thoughts organizing the priorities of the day, the cost of utilities as we read the latest bill.  While each of these experiences has a certain focus, say the economic dimension of the gas bill, nevertheless each experience displays a coherence of many dimensions.  The bill is in a language we understand, set out spatially at the size appropriate to our perceptual capacities that only function by virtue of the continuing health of our bodies as a living organism and so on.  Our experience of reality then can be described as an integral coherence of a rich diversity of aspects or modes of being.  We do not experience any of these aspects on their own, we have no experience of a purely economic reality for example, but neither do we experience pure space, or pure movement.  It is only in theoretical thought that reality appears split us.  The integral character of reality and our place within it become replaced as the focus of our attention with a deliberately chosen, that is not real, opposition between our act of thought and its object of analysis.

However it might be objected that there seems to be something wrong in this analysis for surely there are many things in this world that lack features that have been identified as part of human experience.  For example moral worth, or economic value, even perception of colour and taste, cannot be seen to inhere in reality.  Such things have a first-person ontology.  This view comes from an understanding of nature that arose from the development of modern science where reality is approached exclusively in terms of its physical aspect of mechanical motion, and later that of energy, so that all natural phenomenon must be understood within these terms.  A classic example is Galileo’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of a thing.

The subject-object distinction is usually understood as a structural relation where the subject stands opposite the object as two independent elements of reality.  In terms of what we have already said this means that the subject-object distinction takes the opposition between our act of thought and the object of analysis it has chosen, through abstraction, to be a real opposition between two separate entities instead of a deliberately chosen stance or attitude.  So both sides of the relation, the analytic focus of our thinking and the object of analysis, are artificial and not simply given in reality.  We can, however, speak of a natural subject-object relation which crosses over the whole diversity of meaning rather than cutting it in two.  In this sense we should understand the term ‘subjective’ as relating to the active side of a connection while ‘objective’ relates to the passive side.  This distinction refers to concrete reality rather than to the modal aspects so it is not the case that certain aspects are passive whereas others are active, as is the case with Kant’s opposition between the spontaneity of the understanding (Reason) and the passivity of the forms of intuition (senses). The term subject has the meaning of a thing which makes something happen. This means that by its own nature it brings about some possibilities which are available through the functioning of some modal aspect. In this sense objective refers to when such possibilities are actualised in a thing by some other creature. When a rock is crafted into a beautiful diamond and sold human activity realises passive aesthetic and economic functions of the rock making it an aesthetic and economic object. Since many creatures, and not just humans, make things happen, there can therefore be many different kinds of subject-object connections.

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(22) Modal aspects as universal law spheres

All the modes are universal in character, this is important to understand if we are to see how the modal spheres help explain coherence as well as diversity.  If we look back at the diagram we can see this universal character in the way that the modes stretch across things horizontally.  The implication is that all concrete entities function in all the modes.  

This raises an immediate question: surely trees and stones do not function in all the modes?  It is such a question that tempts us to separate the world into two spheres of object and subject.  We could think here of Descartes dualism between the thinking mind as the knowing subject separate from the physical world of matter, or of Locke’s mind filled with sensations caused by the external material world.  Against this reformational philosophy offers an original and unique perspective on the subject-object distinction using the theory of the modal aspects (see the next section).  We can best understand this if we first look at “object-functions”.

When we analyse a tree we can see how it functions actively in the first five modes of being, however we should also notice that we perceive and analyse the tree, we can admire the beauty of the tree, or assess its economic value.  The existence of the tree is therefore not shut off from our perceiving and logical functioning. While it is true that trees do not perceive and reason they can be perceived and reasoned about.  This means that despite not functioning in an active way within the sensitive and analytical aspects, they do function passively in relation to human perception and analysis.  These are what we call the trees object-functions. 

What this shows is that the modal aspects make relations possible; my perceiving relation towards the tree is possible because we both exist within the sensitive modal aspect.  The modal laws therefore constitute relationships of coherence. I as an active perceiving subject relate to the tree as a perceived object.

Rene Descartes' dualist view has shaped the way philosophers think about our knowledge of the world and leads them to ask the question: how can we as knowing subjects come to know the “external world”.  Notice that while reformational philosophy can speak of a coherence between the knowing subject and her environment the common philosophical tendency to speak of the “external world” creates a separation between the two and sets up the classic, and irresolvable, problem of how we can defeat the sceptic and show we can have knowledge of the world.  Such a way of putting the problem clearly does not do justice to the fact that both knower and known exist in the same world and function within the same modal spheres.   We can see that a reformational analysis of the subject-object relations shows the mistaken nature of this way of framing the problem of knowledge.  Rather than a gap that must be bridged from a knowing subject to a known object, we have a genuine relationship between the two through a whole array of irreducible modes.  The passive functions really belong to the nature of the object and are not mere subjective add-ons.  The object does not exist “in itself”, separate from us, as the German philosopher Immanuel Kant thought, but in relations, we can only take an object out of these relations in an act of thought as an abstraction. 

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(21) Time and the modal aspects

A number of reformational philosophers, including Dooyeweerd in his early phase, considered the possibility that time is one of the modal aspects. However a number of considerations have persuaded most that this is not a viable option. One is that if time were a separate modality, then the other modal spheres would both presuppose this time modality, and would no longer be thought of as integrally temporal in character. Secondly we would need to understand the specific, irreducible character of time, what is its kernel meaning, what would be the analogies with other modal aspects? A further point is that the close connection between time and reality helps us understand the integral coherence of reality which can be understood to be guaranteed by the continuity of time. A final point is that while it is common to think of time as physical time, or in other words clock time that can be measured, we can instead view time as cosmic and so manifesting itself in all the modal aspects. We now look at how time is expressed in each of the modal aspects.

Numbers have a natural sequential order so that in counting we go “successively” from small to large. Smaller numbers are earlier in this progression, whereas larger numbers come later. All this points to the temporal order of numbers. 

The nucleus of the spatial aspect is continuous extension. Shapes and geometric figures can only exist if all their parts are present at the same time. Here time manifests itself in the notion of simultaneity.

Kinematic: Time linked with motion; no motion exists without physical time. This order of motion is reversible. Here time manifests itself as continuous flow.

Physical: Time in the physical aspect manifests itself as irreversible since it deals with energy transfer.  Here we find the sequential order of cause and effect.

Biotic: Here time is expressed through processes of growth, maturity, decline and death. Whereas in the earlier modal aspects there is a fixed pace to processes, in the biotic aspect these processes can take place over different speeds.  Some animals and plants have a short life span, whereas others much longer. The biotic process is characterised by development and decline, there is a progression of germination, growth, maturation, ageing and dying.

Psychical: The discrepancy with physical time can before even more accentuated in emotional time which depends on our mood, tense, bored, excited, engaged, absorbed etc.. Here time can fly or drag on endlessly.

Logical: Here time is expressed in the starting points, premises and presuppositions of our thinking and arguing. In a logical argument the conclusion must follow from the premises in a logically sound way.

Historical: we measure the generational forming of culture with reference to periods, and to features such as progress and regress. In understanding historical develop we often have need of biotic analogies (maturation, flourishing, decline etc.), however these are always in relation to human formative power and so articulate themselves in terms of reforming or revolutionary, conservative or reactionary and so on. Being ahead of your time, or stuck in the past.

Aesthetic: involves both the changing fashions as well as more lasting styles. Tempo, rhythm and pace of change is important. Is it too slow allow new (imaginative possibilities) or is it too fast to allow nuance and ramifications to disclose themselves.

Symbolic: Grammatical tenses, the use of punctuation.

Social: Priority in social relationships. Who has priority in different social situations, the youngest sibling in a game of cards, the chairman in opening the meeting, old people for seats on the bus and so on.

Economic: The role of interest, periodic increments in wages or salary to express the value of experience.  Efficiency and wasting time, spending time wisely etc.

Juridical time: Prison terms, leases, terms of office.

Ethical: the urgency to put right a relationship before the end of the day as scripture recommends. The time it takes for trust to develop in a friendship.

Faith: the alternation of festival days and ordinary time. Liturgy. Hope and expectation.

In seeing time expressed through all the modal spheres we achieve a view of time close to our experience of time.  The rhythm of day and night is not just physical but tied into our biotic clock and psychological experience as shown in experiments where this rhythm is denied, or in the experience of jet lag.  You visit somewhere quaint on holiday and say “my, hasn’t time stood still here”.

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