The distinction between a
“reality in itself” opposed to “appearances” is as old as philosophy
itself. This is to be expected since theoretical
thinking gives us a view of reality quite different from our ordinary
experience. As soon as theory gets going
one has to consider how these two views relate.
We exist within the world as an active participant shaping and being
shaped by the relationships given to us and into which we enter. Our experience is not primarily of isolated
objects or dimensions but of an indissoluble coherence of a rich variety of
facets which impress themselves on us, or recede from our consciousness
depending on our concerns and interests at each moment. First the ray of sunlight, or the sound of an
alarm clock, that wakes us from sleep, our thoughts organizing the priorities
of the day, the cost of utilities as we read the latest bill. While each of these experiences has a certain
focus, say the economic dimension of the gas bill, nevertheless each experience
displays a coherence of many dimensions.
The bill is in a language we understand, set out spatially at the size
appropriate to our perceptual capacities that only function by virtue of the
continuing health of our bodies as a living organism and so on. Our experience of reality then can be
described as an integral coherence of a rich diversity of aspects or modes of being. We do not experience any of these aspects on
their own, we have no experience of a purely economic reality for example, but
neither do we experience pure space, or pure movement. It is only in theoretical thought that reality appears split us. The integral character of reality and our place
within it become replaced as the focus of our attention with a deliberately
chosen, that is not real, opposition between our act of thought and its
object of analysis.
However
it might be objected that there seems to be something wrong in this analysis
for surely there are many things in this world that lack features that have
been identified as part of human experience.
For example moral worth, or economic value, even perception of colour
and taste, cannot be seen to inhere in reality.
Such things have a first-person ontology. This view comes from an understanding of
nature that arose from the development of modern science where reality is
approached exclusively in terms of its physical aspect of mechanical motion,
and later that of energy, so that all natural phenomenon must be understood
within these terms. A classic example is
Galileo’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of a thing.
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