One of the things that Herman Dooyeeerd is known for is his criticism of various dualisms. Many of those who have taken inspiration from Dooyeweerd have taken opposition to all manner of dualisms as a central task of thinking from a Biblical worldview. A good example is the book The Transforming Vision by Brain Walsh and Richard Middleton which has a chapter titled "The Problem of Dualism" followed up by another called "The Development of Dualism" (chapters 6 & 7). The zelousness with which this has sometimes been done has caused some annoyance. A good example is J.V Fesko who dedicates chapter 7 of his book Reforming Apologetics to responding to these criticisms as they relate to natural theology and assessments of Thomas Aquinas. On page 184 he criticises Dooyeweerd for failing to "recognize the difference between a true dichotomy (or separation) and a mere distinction". As with much else in the chapter this is a silly criticism (and one that undermines his central point about the importance of reading the primary sources. I document his failure to read Dooyeweerd's work here). Even Walsh and Middleton in their more popular presentation state clearly "there is a world of difference between dualism and duality" (95). Neverthelss, it is helpful, and interesting in its own right, to get a clearer view of how Dooyeweerd himself understood the difference between a distinction and a dichotomy or dualism.
A nice example of Dooyeweerd discussing this very point is in his response to Cornelius van Til in Jerusalem and Athens.
The objectivism implied in traditional scholastic rationalism evokes as its alternative subjectivism, etc. It is consequently quite understandable that from your standpoint you consider my distinction between conceptual knowledge and central religious knowledge a result of an irrationalist mystical view of the latter. In line with Robbers and van Peursen you interpret this distinction as a separation, so that the central supra-conceptual sphere and the conceptual sphere of knowledge are conceived of as opposite to, and independent of, each other. In this way the distinction is naturally transformed into a dialectical tension, testifying to a dualistic trend in my thought. [emphasis in bold added]
Dooyeweerd claims that his distinction has been "transformed into a dialectical tension". How has this transformation ocurred? First there is an assumed position from which Dooyeweerd's view is interpreted. Dooyeweerd calls it "objectivism" or "rationalism". This view itself already posits an opposition, one between "objectivism" and "subjectivism". That is to say, that objectivism, on its own understanding, sets itself up against an opposed view, subjectivism. It is part of the self-understanding of objectivism (or rationalism) that it is on the right side of an opposition of views with subjectivism on the wrong side.
In the context of the discussion it would appear that "objectivism" is a position that understands knowledge in terms of "conceptual knowledge". The crucial assumption is that "conceptual knowledge" is taken to be a complete account of knowledge such that it is self-standingly intelligible on its own terms. This is the kind of position that Dooyeweerd elsewhere describes as the "pretended autonomy of thought". Such a description draws out the point that "conceptual knowledge" is understood to be free from dependence on any further element. It also highlights Dooyeweerd's typical strategy of challenging such self-dependence as an illusion.
Now objectivism, with its view that conceptual knowledge is complete and indepedent on its own terms, is committed to the view that whatever can be understood as distinct from "conceptual knowledge" must be separate and outside of its sphere. Whatever is not "conceptual knowledge" must therefore be of a totally different nature, it can only be "irrational" or "mystical". When Dooyeweerd claims that "central religious knowledge" is not the same as "conceptual knowledge" the guiding assumptions of objectivism must put such religious knowledge outside of "rational" conceptual knowledge and into its opposite: "irrational" mystical knowledge.
How is it that Dooyeweerd can resist this move? How can he claim that central religious knowledge is not something "opposite to, and independent of" conceptual knowledge while maintaining the importance of the distinction? Dooyeweerd's strategy is to reject the assumption that conceptual knowledge is something that we can make sense of as a self-standing and independent factor of our thinking and experience. His theory of the modal aspects makes this clear. Conceptual thinking is impossible without a multiplicity of distinguished elements brought together into a conceptual unity. This demonstrates the necessity of a basis in the numerical aspect of reality. There is further the logical extension of a concept pointing to the spatial aspect, the movement of thought, the relation of logical grounds to consequents, the life of thought resting on the functioning of the brain and logical representation based on our sensations. Any deepened sense of conceptual thought whereby the thinker can be said to have some rational control over the development and evaluation of their thinking and so can be held accountable involves the historical-formative aspect, the symbolic representation of thought points to the lingual aspect, the possibility to pursuade, to engage in dialogue, to evaluate requirements of the economy of thought, justification of reasons, while showing a proper concern for truth, each point beyond the merely logical-conceptual to all the other aspects of our experience. This integral coherence and multidimensional character of experience undermines the assumption that rational or conceptual knowledge can be taken as an independent sphere separated from the rest of our experience.
On Dooyeweerd's view the integral coherence that marks the multidimensional character of human experience finds it unity in the central religious root of the human heart. Now, sometimes, when people are first introduced to Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal spheres, and especially when the emphasis is laid on their irreducibility, there is a temptation to interpret his theory as involving a series of layers that sit on top of each other. It can then seem to be an important task to work out what sphere different things "belong" to in a way that makes the modal spheres appear to be separate and independent from each other. Such an interpretation can only end up transfoming Dooyeweerd's distinctions into a whole series of dialectical tensions! Exactly the kind of dialectical problems that his theory is designed to disolve are then interpreted back into his theory. It is essential then, for a correct understanding of Dooyeweerd, that we learn the lesson of the opening paragraph of the New Critique:
If I consider reality as it is given in the naive pre-theoretical experience, and then confront it with a theoretical analysis, through which reality appears to split up into various modal aspects then the first thing that strikes me, is the original indissoluble interrelation among these aspects which are for the first time explicitly distinguished in the theoretical attitude of mind. A indissoluble inner coherence binds the numerical to the spatial aspect, the latter to the aspect of mathematical movement, the aspect of movement to that of physical energy, which iself is the necessary basis of the aspect of organic life. The aspect of organic life has an inner connection with that of psychical feeling, the latter refers in its logical anticipation (the feeling of logical correctness or incorrectness) to the analytical-logical aspect. This in turn is connected with the historical, the linguistic, the aspect of social intercourse, the economic,the aesthetic,the jural,the moral aspects and that of faith. In this inter-modal cosmic coherence no single aspect stands by itself; everyone refers within and beyond itself to all the others. [emphasis in bold added]
We can now return to the first passage quoted above and give two reasons why his distinction between the central supra-conceptual sphere and the conceprtual sphere of knowledge avoids the pitfall of becoming a dialectical tension. The first is Dooyeweerd's account of the unity rooted in the human heart which undermines any sense in which rational thought could be considered as opposite to or cut off from central religious knowledge. Instead it is from out of the human heart that come the issues of life, which is to say that rational thought cannot be understood except in intimate connection with the central supra-conceptual sphere. Equally, Dooyeweerd claimed that the human heart, this central "I", is nothing in itself outside of its relation to God, other humans and the world, all of which are expressed through the diverse aspects including that of rational thought. The second is the way Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal spheres helps us see the incoherence of thinking of rational thought as something that could exist in itself, independent of the rest of human experience. In this way Dooyeweerd allows for a rich variety of distinctions to account for our living experience in the world without those distinctions becoming transformed into dialectical tensions.
