Dooyeweerd is often
misunderstood to reject all prior philosophy. His claim that philosophy has
deep religious roots is taken to imply that a Christian is thereby duty bound
to reject all philosophy that is not explicitly founded on the Christian religion.
However, he rejects this view thoroughly and repeatedly. Here is one such
example.
“Philosophic thought as such
stands in an inner relationship with historical development, postulated by our
very philosophical basic Idea, and no thinker whatever can withdraw himself
from this historical evolution. Our transcendental ground-idea itself requires
the recognition of the “philosophia perennis" in this sense and rejects
the proud illusion that any thinker whatever, could begin as it were with a
clean slate and disassociate himself from the development of an age-old process
of philosophical reflection.
…
Whoever takes the pains to
penetrate into the philosophic system developed in this work, will soon
discover, how it is wedded to the historical development of philosophic and
scientific thought with a thousand ties, so far as its immanent philosophic content
is concerned, even though we can nowhere follow the
immanence-philosophy.” (NC I, 118)
I’ve made a provisional translation of Johan van der Hoeven’s assessment of Dooyeweerd’s engagement with modern philosophy. See here.
My article "Herman Dooyeweerd and Marburg Neo-Kantianism" will be in the next issue of Philosophia Reformata. It is available in the "advanced articles" now.
One of the things that Herman Dooyeeerd is known for is his criticism of various dualisms. Many of those who have taken inspiration from Dooyeweerd have taken opposition to all manner of dualisms as a central task of thinking from a Biblical worldview. A good example is the book The Transforming Vision by Brain Walsh and Richard Middleton which has a chapter titled "The Problem of Dualism" followed up by another called "The Development of Dualism" (chapters 6 & 7). The zelousness with which this has sometimes been done has caused some annoyance. A good example is J.V Fesko who dedicates chapter 7 of his book Reforming Apologetics to responding to these criticisms as they relate to natural theology and assessments of Thomas Aquinas. On page 184 he criticises Dooyeweerd for failing to "recognize the difference between a true dichotomy (or separation) and a mere distinction". As with much else in the chapter this is a silly criticism (and one that undermines his central point about the importance of reading the primary sources. I document his failure to read Dooyeweerd's work here). Even Walsh and Middleton in their more popular presentation state clearly "there is a world of difference between dualism and duality" (95). Neverthelss, it is helpful, and interesting in its own right, to get a clearer view of how Dooyeweerd himself understood the difference between a distinction and a dichotomy or dualism.
A nice example of Dooyeweerd discussing this very point is in his response to Cornelius van Til in Jerusalem and Athens.
The objectivism implied in traditional scholastic rationalism evokes as its alternative subjectivism, etc. It is consequently quite understandable that from your standpoint you consider my distinction between conceptual knowledge and central religious knowledge a result of an irrationalist mystical view of the latter. In line with Robbers and van Peursen you interpret this distinction as a separation, so that the central supra-conceptual sphere and the conceptual sphere of knowledge are conceived of as opposite to, and independent of, each other. In this way the distinction is naturally transformed into a dialectical tension, testifying to a dualistic trend in my thought. [emphasis in bold added]
Dooyeweerd claims that his distinction has been "transformed into a dialectical tension". How has this transformation ocurred? First there is an assumed position from which Dooyeweerd's view is interpreted. Dooyeweerd calls it "objectivism" or "rationalism". This view itself already posits an opposition, one between "objectivism" and "subjectivism". That is to say, that objectivism, on its own understanding, sets itself up against an opposed view, subjectivism. It is part of the self-understanding of objectivism (or rationalism) that it is on the right side of an opposition of views with subjectivism on the wrong side.
In the context of the discussion it would appear that "objectivism" is a position that understands knowledge in terms of "conceptual knowledge". The crucial assumption is that "conceptual knowledge" is taken to be a complete account of knowledge such that it is self-standingly intelligible on its own terms. This is the kind of position that Dooyeweerd elsewhere describes as the "pretended autonomy of thought". Such a description draws out the point that "conceptual knowledge" is understood to be free from dependence on any further element. It also highlights Dooyeweerd's typical strategy of challenging such self-dependence as an illusion.
Now objectivism, with its view that conceptual knowledge is complete and indepedent on its own terms, is committed to the view that whatever can be understood as distinct from "conceptual knowledge" must be separate and outside of its sphere. Whatever is not "conceptual knowledge" must therefore be of a totally different nature, it can only be "irrational" or "mystical". When Dooyeweerd claims that "central religious knowledge" is not the same as "conceptual knowledge" the guiding assumptions of objectivism must put such religious knowledge outside of "rational" conceptual knowledge and into its opposite: "irrational" mystical knowledge.
How is it that Dooyeweerd can resist this move? How can he claim that central religious knowledge is not something "opposite to, and independent of" conceptual knowledge while maintaining the importance of the distinction? Dooyeweerd's strategy is to reject the assumption that conceptual knowledge is something that we can make sense of as a self-standing and independent factor of our thinking and experience. His theory of the modal aspects makes this clear. Conceptual thinking is impossible without a multiplicity of distinguished elements brought together into a conceptual unity. This demonstrates the necessity of a basis in the numerical aspect of reality. There is further the logical extension of a concept pointing to the spatial aspect, the movement of thought, the relation of logical grounds to consequents, the life of thought resting on the functioning of the brain and logical representation based on our sensations. Any deepened sense of conceptual thought whereby the thinker can be said to have some rational control over the development and evaluation of their thinking and so can be held accountable involves the historical-formative aspect, the symbolic representation of thought points to the lingual aspect, the possibility to pursuade, to engage in dialogue, to evaluate requirements of the economy of thought, justification of reasons, while showing a proper concern for truth, each point beyond the merely logical-conceptual to all the other aspects of our experience. This integral coherence and multidimensional character of experience undermines the assumption that rational or conceptual knowledge can be taken as an independent sphere separated from the rest of our experience.
On Dooyeweerd's view the integral coherence that marks the multidimensional character of human experience finds it unity in the central religious root of the human heart. Now, sometimes, when people are first introduced to Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal spheres, and especially when the emphasis is laid on their irreducibility, there is a temptation to interpret his theory as involving a series of layers that sit on top of each other. It can then seem to be an important task to work out what sphere different things "belong" to in a way that makes the modal spheres appear to be separate and independent from each other. Such an interpretation can only end up transfoming Dooyeweerd's distinctions into a whole series of dialectical tensions! Exactly the kind of dialectical problems that his theory is designed to disolve are then interpreted back into his theory. It is essential then, for a correct understanding of Dooyeweerd, that we learn the lesson of the opening paragraph of the New Critique:
If I consider reality as it is given in the naive pre-theoretical experience, and then confront it with a theoretical analysis, through which reality appears to split up into various modal aspects then the first thing that strikes me, is the original indissoluble interrelation among these aspects which are for the first time explicitly distinguished in the theoretical attitude of mind. A indissoluble inner coherence binds the numerical to the spatial aspect, the latter to the aspect of mathematical movement, the aspect of movement to that of physical energy, which iself is the necessary basis of the aspect of organic life. The aspect of organic life has an inner connection with that of psychical feeling, the latter refers in its logical anticipation (the feeling of logical correctness or incorrectness) to the analytical-logical aspect. This in turn is connected with the historical, the linguistic, the aspect of social intercourse, the economic,the aesthetic,the jural,the moral aspects and that of faith. In this inter-modal cosmic coherence no single aspect stands by itself; everyone refers within and beyond itself to all the others. [emphasis in bold added]
We can now return to the first passage quoted above and give two reasons why his distinction between the central supra-conceptual sphere and the conceprtual sphere of knowledge avoids the pitfall of becoming a dialectical tension. The first is Dooyeweerd's account of the unity rooted in the human heart which undermines any sense in which rational thought could be considered as opposite to or cut off from central religious knowledge. Instead it is from out of the human heart that come the issues of life, which is to say that rational thought cannot be understood except in intimate connection with the central supra-conceptual sphere. Equally, Dooyeweerd claimed that the human heart, this central "I", is nothing in itself outside of its relation to God, other humans and the world, all of which are expressed through the diverse aspects including that of rational thought. The second is the way Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal spheres helps us see the incoherence of thinking of rational thought as something that could exist in itself, independent of the rest of human experience. In this way Dooyeweerd allows for a rich variety of distinctions to account for our living experience in the world without those distinctions becoming transformed into dialectical tensions.
A.R.J.A.
It is with ardent conviction that I acceded to the request of the board of A.R.J.A. to draw attention to the work of the Young Antirevolutionary Study Clubs.
There still is far too little awareness among us that our whole movement is caught up in the crucible of our great and anxious times which will reduce to ashes everything that does not survive that fiery trial.
There is also too little awareness among us that a task greater than ever before is waiting for us in the service of our King Christ Jesus to propagate our principles with deepened knowledge and true inspiration in a world where the spirit of darkness is at work.
It is alarming to see how in our own circles many young people and even older folk are swept along by fascist and communist currents, how many are spiritually uprooted and become an easy prey to the radical and demonic powers which since the world war have been threatening Europe with spiritual dissolution.
In the name of our God we must adjure our young people:
Arm yourself with the full armour of faith and prayer, and deepen your knowledge for the political struggle that awaits you!
Do not think – for God’s sake, do not think for a moment – that we can just continue to live off the strengths that we have amassed in the past. Let the terror of the Lord enter our souls as we face the mighty signs of the times!
Young people! Remember your calling before it is too late.
Your place is with the young guard of study clubs who have realized that a spiritual standstill will mean our spiritual demise.
In our day, when such tremendously complicated questions are disturbing mankind, the intellectual equipment of those who went before you no longer suffices.
The propaganda of unbelief, the spirit of revolution – they are today armed with weapons that are extremely dangerous to all who do not know their effect and are not familiar with their toxic subtleties.
Against these only prayer avails, and a faith which glows with zeal for the cause of the Lord, but which will then irresistibly drive you on to whet the weapons with which you will soon wage the warfare of your principles.
H. Dooyeweerd
column in De Standaard
Tues, 29 Nov. 1932
[4 months before Hitler’s coup]
Translated by Harry van Dyke
Because New Critique is both a translation and a revision of Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, commentators face tricky questions when they interpret Dooyeweerd’s magnum opus. This is especially so of English passages that seem prima facie to translate the Dutch version. Sometimes there are significant differences in meaning between equivalent passages in the two works. One does not always know whether this is due to the quality of the translation or due to a change in Dooyeweerd’s conception. Although I shall note a number of these differences, to give them a complete interpretation would take me too far afield. Where the English version translates an equivalent passage in the Dutch version, I occasionally use square brackets to indicate nuances in Dutch not caught in the English version. I also silently modify translated passages in other ways, usually to render them in more idiomatic English. What Dooyeweerd scholars really need is a thorough, critical edition of NC, one that sorts out the differences between WW and NC and makes informed judgments about the nature and source of those differences. In the meantime, a careful reader of Dooyeweerd should use both WW and NC, and not assume that everything in NC is a faithful rendering of his own conception.
“the entire conception to the effect that temporal reality should be something statically given, a fixed “Vorhandenes”, rests upon a fundamental failure to appreciate the dynamic character of reality in the whole coherence of its different modal aspects. In our view, this dynamic character is guaranteed by the mode of ex-sistence of all created things as meaning, finding no rest in itself, and by the opening-process of temporal reality” (NC I 112)
This theme of creational dynamics is something that Mekkes took up in his philosophical reflection, he wrote that
"right from the beginning reformational philosophy emphasized the dynamic character of creation as being God's first revelation to the creature. That's why it spoke of the ground-motive of creation."
In another place he speaks of the
"thesis of disclosure, a dynamic principle" which is "not secondary with regard to the modalities, as if the latter could be subsequently related to each other in a dynamic relation. It is the dynamics of creaturely meaning which shows itself in those modal aspects. It is the dynamics which is primary."Mekkes placed at the centre of his philosophical work the themes of creational dynamics, religion as radix and a critique of Reason. These are themes are certainly present in Dooyeweerd, yet it appears that Mekkes came to develop them in distinctive ways. Since Mekkes work is a very difficult and as yet largely untranslated we will have to wait for more work to be done to assess his contribution to reformational philosophy. The glimpses I have seen and the evidence of those he influenced (eg Bob Goudzwaard) suggest to me that he is well worth a serious study.
“Our transcendental critique wages a merciless war against the masking of supra-theoretical prejudices as theoretical axioms which are forced upon the opponent on penalty of his being viewed as an outsider in philosophical matters. In other words, it aims its attack against the dogmatic exclusivism of the schools, all of which fancy themselves to possess the monopoly on philosophical truth” (NC I 70)
Humanism that holds to the autonomy of theoretical thought must conclude that exclusive 'supra-theoretical prejudices' which reside at the base of theoretical thinking must cut off philosophical communication. Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the fundamental antithesis between the central motive of Christianity and that of all other religious impulses which have guided philosophy is surely poof of such obscurantism, yet he insists on the continuing contact between Christian philosophy and immanence philosophy.
“this radical rupture with the starting-points and transcendental ground-Ideas of immanence-philosophy does not mean, that an intrinsically re-formed Christian philosophy should intend to break off philosophical contact with Greek, scholastic, and modern Humanistic philosophy. On the contrary, because of its radical-critical standpoint, the Christian philosophy developed in this work is enabled to enter into the most inward contact with immanence-philosophy”
Dooyeweerd further insists that his philosophy “will never break the community of philosophical thought” because to do so would be to return to a dogmatic conflation of religious pre-suppositions and theoretical axioms (NC I 115). Then a few pages on Dooyeweerd writes that his philosophy “is wedded to the historical development of philosophic and scientific thought with a thousand ties” (NC I 118). It would be good to see more work done on exploring these ties.
Here’s a succinct summary of Dooyeweerd’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences:
“each special realm of theoretical inquiry, whether or not it is called “empirical” in the narrower sense, pre-supposes a theoretical vision of temporal reality. And such a vision of reality must necessarily exhibit a philosophical character. Consequently it appears at the same time, that no single special science can possess an essential autonomy with respect to philosophy in the sense of a theory of reality” (NC I 49)
I think that it is worth pointing out that such a “vision of reality” does not require full comprehension of reality. Its purpose is to set the tone of ones research based on an insight on how things hang together. This is often a reductionist vision taking one of the (abstracted) modal-spheres as the theoretical entry-point to reality, but it need not be. It is the positive contribution of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy to sketch what an anti-reductionist ontology looks like.
“Our selfhood … is never to be eliminated from the act of thought” (NC I 23)
This statement shows how theoretical thought is not self-sufficient for it relies on the non-theoretical and more-than-logical human selfhood. Human thought is an actual activity and so theory is a human artefact. Recognising this puts limits on theoretical thought and in particular its ability to comprehend the human subject, even the thinking human subject cannot be grasped in a theoretical concept. Dooyeweerd explains this saying “the “gegenstand-relation” can only be an intentional relation within the real act of theoretical thought between its logical and its non-logical aspects. The real act itself can never be made the “Gegenstand” of its logical function, since the latter can be actual only within a real act of our consciousness, and does not have any actuality in a theoretical abstraction” (NC I 50)
This takes us back to the negative result of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique. To arrive at an understanding of the religious root of thought requires an act of self-reflection that is not theoretical.
