Just War Theory

It is sometimes argued that Just war theory (JWT) is of no use because it is ineffective to stop wars and is often used by governments prosecuting war as a moral cover for its actions. A further criticism is that JWT only kicks in at the last minute when the chances of a peaceful outcome is fast receding from improbable to impossible. In other words JWT finds the limelight just as the decision to go to war has been made and the government is looking around for a way of justifying this decision.

These criticisms seem to me me a little unfair. Firstly even if the slide to war has acquired a sense of inevitability the first requirement of JWT is that all peaceful means have been exhausted so there is a chance to pull back and consider other avenues, the government can also be criticised for opportunities missed or deliberately spoiled. This requirement also highlights the properly limited character of JWT because it points to the need for a Just Peace Theory, which is to say that JWT should be understood as only one specific outworking of a broader theory of the states task of pursuing justice. Its ineffectiveness in preventing war is not a failure of JWT so much as a more general failure of governments to seek justice in all its actions, in particular in the international realm.

The use of JWT in trying to give a moral veneer to an unjust war is certainly to be regretted, but appeals to freedom and democracy for ideological purposes are equally to be deplored, and these need not be discredited on account of such abuse. The only other options for a critique of warmongering is an absolutistic pacificism, such a position certainly cannot be co-opted in the justification of war! However by its very absolute character pacificism is unable to engage with the specifics of a particular situation, JWT in contrast encourages a critical evaluation of the situation which can latch onto the concrete realities of states entering into peace endangering scenarios.

JWT, it should be remembered, has a role to play in evaluating the prosecution of war and military hostilities just as much as in the decision to go to war. This is illustrated in this article from the Economist on Israels actions in Gaza. In a more thorough fashion see James Skillen's assessment of the war in Iraq from a while back.

Critique as unmasking

Dooyeweerd assures his readers that his transcendental critique does not cut each philosophical school off from each other in incommensurable starting-points. It is instead the dogma of theoretical autonomy that threatens genuine philosophical dialogue.

“Our transcendental critique wages a merciless war against the masking of supra-theoretical prejudices as theoretical axioms which are forced upon the opponent on penalty of his being viewed as an outsider in philosophical matters. In other words, it aims its attack against the dogmatic exclusivism of the schools, all of which fancy themselves to possess the monopoly on philosophical truth” (NC I 70)

Dooyeweerd emphasises again and again that it is the Christian understanding of the radicality of evil that cuts off any theoretical pride in claiming to possess the monopoly on theoretical truth. In contrast humanism, under the inspiration of the enlightenment, has become more dogmatic in affirming its supra-theoretical beliefs as irrefutable rational certainties.

Humanism that holds to the autonomy of theoretical thought must conclude that exclusive 'supra-theoretical prejudices' which reside at the base of theoretical thinking must cut off philosophical communication. Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the fundamental antithesis between the central motive of Christianity and that of all other religious impulses which have guided philosophy is surely poof of such obscurantism, yet he insists on the continuing contact between Christian philosophy and immanence philosophy.

“this radical rupture with the starting-points and transcendental ground-Ideas of immanence-philosophy does not mean, that an intrinsically re-formed Christian philosophy should intend to break off philosophical contact with Greek, scholastic, and modern Humanistic philosophy. On the contrary, because of its radical-critical standpoint, the Christian philosophy developed in this work is enabled to enter into the most inward contact with immanence-philosophy”

Dooyeweerd further insists that his philosophy “will never break the community of philosophical thought” because to do so would be to return to a dogmatic conflation of religious pre-suppositions and theoretical axioms (NC I 115). Then a few pages on Dooyeweerd writes that his philosophy “is wedded to the historical development of philosophic and scientific thought with a thousand ties” (NC I 118). It would be good to see more work done on exploring these ties.

Multidimensional Critical Theory

I have been reading Best and Kellner’s Postmodern Theory lately, it gives very clear exposition and critique of a number of important postmodern thinkers in relation to social theory. No doubt an important reason for their clarity is to be found in the development of their own position in the areas dealt with. In their last chapter they begin to outline this view which is described as multidimensional and multiperspectival.

Here’s what they say about its multidimensional character:

A multidimensional critical theory will provide an analysis of the relative autonomy of the various levels or domains of social reality and the ways in which they interact to form a specific mode of social organization. A multidimensional critical theory is dialecti­cal and non-reductive. It conceptualizes the connections between the economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions of society and refuses to reduce social phenomena to any one dimension. A dialectical theory describes the mediations, or interconnections, that relate social phenomena to each other and the dominant mode of social organization. (page 263)

Despite their admirable emphasis on a non-reductive social theory, their notion of a “social organisation” strongly suggests the presence of a whole-part scheme. Throughout the book, Best and Kellner have expressed their appreciation for the development of ‘micro-level’ analyses of society, yet time and again they bemoan the loss of a ‘macro-level’ analysis. One of their constant refrains is the “under theorization” of intersubjectivity/political economy/social hegemony and domination and other macro-level phenomena. This is why they need a notion of ‘social organisation’ to function as the ‘whole’ that substantiates macro-analysis, the “social dimensions” are the elements or parts that are the object of microanalysis, these then get connected dialectically in the macro-analyses to give a view of the ‘social organization’.

Reformational social theory rejects any view of society as a whole; there is no social community that encompass the whole of human life. Instead it insists on the plural structure of society with a differentiation of limited social tasks and responsibilities. The diverse social institutions that take up these tasks, as well as having a limited kind of competence, should be arranged non-hierarchically because they have their meaning within the temporal horizon of creation. An analysis of these diverse social tasks, with the relationships and institutions that respond to them should highlight their qualitative difference wherein is found a diversity of specific norms integral to the carrying out of the specific tasks.

While Best and Kellner recognise an irreducible diversity of social relations their whole-part scheme doesn’t allow them to discern the differentiation of social norms, so while they hold to a normative approach the norms they appeal tend to be quiet general: progressive-regressive, domination-liberation, justice etc.

Marx and Critical Theory

This year I am teaching Marx and Engels The German Ideology. So I have been doing some reading on Marx. I seem to be gaining an interest in political philosophy, so with my background in European Philosophy I guess it's not surprising that I am also reading around in Critical Theory. In particular critical theory provides an interesting discussion partner with so called "postmodern" philosophy.

All this makes me anticipate the publication of the following two books even more keenly.

Bob Goudzwaard Hope in Troubled Times

Lambert Zuidervaart Social Philosophy After Adorno