Saturday, February 10, 2007

Johann Hari on the Enlightenment

Johann Hari writing in the Independent on Monday appears to be rather enamoured of the enlightenment. The enlightenment philosophers argued that “instead of relying on divine revelation, we should closely observe the world around us and base a rational world-view on the empirical evidence we gather.” This is, so Hari believes, a truly wonderful vision. Those who oppose it like the Chapmans, whose work Hari rightly deplores, are basically in league with the “fascists and priests” who have sort to puncture and destroy it for the past 300 years. So unequivocal is Hari’s enthusiasm that he confidently declares that “Everything good about our world … comes from this project”.

This leads him to dismiss “post-modern” philosophy, of which the Chapmans work is apparently the “pure expression”. According to Hari “When you strip away our Enlightenment defences against psychosis” all you are left with is “immoral anger, celebrating injustice and cruelty as ‘transgression’”. This raises a number of questions. Can enlightenment thought really be neatly separated from all the bloody revolutions, fascisms, imperialisms and totalitarianisms that were a feature of modernist Europe? Was it really Hitler’s failure, as Hari seems to suggest, to “scrupulously adhere to fact, evidence and reason-based inferences” that produced the Nazi monster?

Hari is obviously not aware of the thesis of the dialectic of enlightenment where instrumentalized reason becomes irrational. Nor does he seem to realize that the kind of faith in facts and empirical evidence that he so applauds in enlightenment thought actually undermines his own moral critique of post-modernism. David Hume divorced facts from values and A.J.Ayer's philosophy of “scrupulous adherence to fact, evidence and reason-based inferences” led to the claim that moral judgements are strictly meaningless – a bit of a pain if you want to condemn the torture and destruction of human life.

So while Hari is right to criticise the facile rejection of the enlightenment expressed in the Chapmans work, he would do well temper his rather extravagant faith in the facts alone.

Speaking from Faith in Democracy

Jonathan Chaplin's inaugural lecture for the Kirby Laing Institute "Speaking from Faith in Democracy" is now available on-line.

Friday, February 09, 2007

The end of Philosophy of Mind?


Does this mean I won't need to teach philosophy of mind next year?

Ice Day?

No photos today, as I don't seem to be able to find any ice. Nevertheless, arriving at school this morning fully equipped with my football kit for the customary Friday-after-school game, I was rather surprised to find the gates all locked and notices that the dangerous icy conditions meant the school was closed.

Thursday, February 08, 2007

Snow day!


School was closed today due to snow, Hurrah! It doesn't take much to disrupt life here in London.

Wednesday, January 31, 2007

Some Links

Joel Hunter on Derrida here.

Gideon Strauss has an excellent piece on postmodernism here.

Richard Mouw has just started to blog.

Macht on Emergent Properties, Abstraction and Reductionism.

And some study guides on Dooyeweerd’s :

Christian idea of the state ,

Twilight of Western Thought,

Roots of Western Culture ,

and New Critique.

So there are no excuses now!

Tuesday, January 30, 2007

"In my judgement ..."

I read a comment the other day in a weekly that noted how politicians often use phrases that ‘real people’ never use. One of the examples given was “In my judgement …”. The comment was obviously put critically while not offering any actual critique. Perhaps the implication was that such an opening to a sentence unduly inflated the statement which followed.

Whatever the un-stated reason for the writer’s antipathy, I want to suggest, in contrast, that we (‘real people’) start using this little phrase more. It should be brought in for the far more popular “in my opinion …” which is caught in an unhappy paradox. First off the statement acquires an unchallengeable, absolute status; you may dislike or reject my opinion, but you can’t criticise it. Any attempt to offer criticism can be dismissed as merely your opinion. In other words the paradoxical other side of the coin is the sheer relativity of opinion. The result is that “my opinion” escapes any responsibility precisely because it is mine, and over what is mine, so the liberal assumption goes, you can have no say. Giving ones judgement suggests that your point is being made after some thought which could be challenged, revised or rejected. It deliberately puts ones views under the scrutiny of others, exactly where politicians, but also ‘real peoples’ views should be. Opinions, on the other hand, are private affairs; while you are free to reject them and have your own, it is in bad taste to challenge them and suggest they might be wrong.

It seems to me that a good start in combating the almost ubiquitous relativism that characterises modern liberal societies would be to start taking responsibility for the claims we make by prefacing them with “in my judgement …”

Monday, January 22, 2007

Grace Church Lectures

At Grace Church people are encouraged to give lectures on areas where they have some interest or expertise. Next Sunday 28 January 7.30pm Dr James May will give a lecture on "The God Delusion: Is Richard Dawkins right?" It will last Approx 1hour including time for questions.
Previous lectures have covered topics such as the "history of conflict" between science and Christianity, bio-ethics and obscure indie bands. You can find an example on-line by Tim Murray, who runs the Film Club, his lecture was titled “Is Hollywood’s Art in the right Place”. Hopefully there will be a lecture on the reformational worldview in the not too distant future.

The relationship between individuals and society

I have started to look at Mill's arguments in On Liberty with my philosophy students, and to set some context we looked at three views on the relationship between individuals and society: Individualism, Collectivism and Pluralism. Here's how I outlined each view:

Individualism makes the individual the basic unit of society. This is based on a view of the individual as essentially independent and self-sufficient and so takes the social dimension of being human as secondary. Individualists argue that society could not exist without individuals and so individuals are more basic than society. Individualism has contributed greatly to a sense of the importance and uniqueness of each person, yet each person is not fundamentally alone but is rather always involved in a web of social relationships. Individuals are always parents/children, students/teachers, sellers/buyers, employers/employees etc.

Collectivism in contrast emphasises the organic wholeness of society, and tends to see one institution (usually the state) as the most essential expression of the unity of the whole. Collectivists argue that individuals could not survive without society. Individuals are merely parts of the whole, and the "lesser" institutions are subgroups that only have a purpose in the way they support the primary unifying institution. Collectivism emphasises the need for belonging, and for working together for the benefit of everyone, however it is also prone to disregard the views of dissident individuals, and tends to obscure the identity and integrity of the many different social structures that coexist with the state.

Pluralism is no mere compromise between these two views for it adds an important reality, that of a plurality of associations and institutions. Pluralism holds that neither the individual nor society can exist without the other, both exist in co-dependence. This view against individualism denies that there are pure isolated individuals because each person always stands in a variety of social relations. Against collectivism it denies that there is an all embracing social structure. Instead it recognizes that there are different institutions with their own distinct identity and sphere of influence, authority and responsibility. With individualism it accepts that these institutions are made up of individuals and with collectivism it agrees that the state plays an important role in balancing the interests of the various institutions. In pluralism there are no individuals totally outside of such structures however marginalized, nor does the state have either the authority or responsibility to fulfil the functions unique to each institution.

Sunday, January 14, 2007

Blair on air travel and climate change

This is a little old now, but still worth commenting on. Tony Blair is not willing to give up his long-haul flights. Here is the reason why:

Britain is 2% of the world's emissions. We shut down all of Britain's emissions tomorrow - the growth in China will make up the difference within two years. So we've got to be realistic about how much obligation we've got to put on ourselves. The danger, for example, if you say to people 'Right, in Britain ... you're not going to have any more cheap air travel,' everybody else is going to be having it. So you've got to do this together in a way that doesn't end up actually putting people off the green agenda by saying you must not have a good time any more and can't consume. All the evidence is that if you use the science and technology constructively, your economy can grow, people can have a good time, but do so more responsibly.


I think that James Skillen’s comments on international justice in 1975 have relevance to this attitude. Skillen wrote:

The ready reply that such a thing will never happen, given modern nationalism and human selfishness in general, can only have the value of warning us that the world's doom is certain. One who believes that the pragmatic response of "It isn't possible" can itself serve as a norm for "realistic" action is only fooling himself. Any pragmatic effort to "work with" national, self-interested politics puts itself in the service of that nationalism and can lead only to the deadend of injustice

The hope that market mechanisms together with science and technology will fix the problems of climate change is a dangerous faith that fosters the avoidance of responsibility, "we don't have to worry or change our way of life, the scientists will fix things", while fatalistically accepting the status quo.

I should point out, or perhaps confess, that I take regular trips by plane to Italy to visit my in-laws. So the point is not to make a moralistic, and possibly hypocritical, judgement on the Blair's lifestyle. We all have reason to reflect and confess out failings with regard to our lack of stewardly living. Instead the point is to question the pragmatic and responsibility evading self justification. My own feeble attempt to reduce the amount of meat I eat is not to off-set the flights to Italy, nor the growing energy consumption of China! God has not tasked me with saving the world, just to love mercy, justice and to walk humbly before God.

Wednesday, January 10, 2007

Chaplin on Liberalism and Toleration: Part Two

As mentioned in the previous post Chaplin focuses on situations where student groups on university campuses affiliated to the student associations have been disaffiliated on the basis of discrimination due to their position on homosexual relations. The "individualistic regime of tolerance" would put racial discrimination and discrimination against homosexuals on the same level, however Chaplin demurs:

those who place racial identity and views on sexual morality in the same category are simply not comparing like with like. As a biologically determined trait, racial identity is wholly outside someone's choice, while also being profoundly implicated in someone's social identity. This is the basic reason why we have rightly come to insist that racial discrimination is arbitrary. Views of sexual morality, by contrast, are elective: we adopt them, either through individual choice or by remaining within a community that upholds them. And for some, the views they hold on this question are profoundly connected to their own moral or religious identity, such that being required to suspend or disavow them is experienced as deeply compromising.

Unfortunately Chaplin has himself failed to compare like with like. He compares race, the object of discrimination, as a biologically determined trait, not with homosexuality, but with “views of sexual morality”. Chaplin should have compared views on race with views on sexual morality, or, race and homosexuality themselves. If he compared the latter the immediate question would be is homosexuality “a biologically determined trait” or at least akin to such a trait (i.e. not merely a free lifestyle choice). This seems to be one of the key points at issue.
The issue has again been in the news with the new "Sexual Orientation Regulations" which form part of the Equality Act 2006 just come into force in Northern Ireland and to be law in the rest of the UK later this year. There have been protests outside Parliament, mainly made up of Christians. Those against the new law have opposed it on grounds of the conscience and free speech of Christians and others who object to homosexual practice, with a distinction drawn between homosexuals and homosexual practice. The first should not be disciminated against, but Christians want the freedom to refuse providing services to homosexuals that would condone homosexual practice. The example given is that of Christian Hotel refusing to provide a room to a homosexual couple.
In response to these kinds of arguments Lord Smith said: "I am somewhat puzzled by the arguments that have been advanced. It seems to me, in my simplistic way, that what they (the opponents of the regulations) are arguing for is quite simply the right to discriminate and the right to harass. And those arguments are being made in the name of Christianity."
What this suggests is that Chaplin still needs to present an argument to explain why “those who place racial identity and views on sexual morality in the same category are simply not comparing like with like”.

Saturday, January 06, 2007

Chaplin on Liberalism and Toleration: Part One

Comment have been running a series on “living with liberalism”. A recent piece is by Jonathan Chaplin’s who discusses liberalism and the issue of tolerance. Halfway through his discussion he makes an interesting suggestion:

A hypothesis worth pursuing (further than I can here) is that the new liberal regime is expanding its remit at the same time as—and perhaps because of—its decreasing capacity to deliver the wide-ranging social services it used to think of as essential to its mandate. If there is truth is this, the irony is rich: as liberal states, under pressures from increasingly globalized economic exchanges, are less and less able or willing to resist the progressive marketization of civil society, and the consequent dismantling of their welfare systems, they simultaneously pursue the progressive politicization of civil society. As the power to restrain business corporations slips through their fingers—indeed, as they all too willingly cede it—they grab hold ever more jealously of the reins of voluntary associations, which are easier targets. A diagnosis of this new apparent twist in the pathology of late modern liberal states awaits.

Part of this politicization of civil society is the “monopolistic enforcement of an individualistic regime of tolerance”. What this means is that "arithmetical equality, understood as identical treatment for individuals across a wide range of institutional practices within all societies" is given priority with no, or little, concern for the internal beliefs and purposes of diverse associations. That means that associations are not given freedom to set their own limits to tolerance within their sphere of action and competence. This is a problem because there has to be differently set limits to tolerance within different societal spheres. Parents, teachers and leaders of political parties have to set different limits to toleration for their children, students and cabinet members, limits that may be inappropriate in different contexts.

To illustrate the inappropriate enforcement of an individualistic regime of tolerance Chaplin focuses on situations where student groups on university campuses affiliated to the student associations have been disaffiliated on the basis of discrimination due to their position on homosexual relations.

Yesterday a similar issue hit the news here in the UK. In my home town of Exeter the Christian Union (which has now been “democratically” forced to change its name to the Evangelical Christian Union) has been suspended from the student guild and had a bank account frozen (see here and here). Not on the basis of a position taken on homosexual relations, but because members are asked to sign a statement of belief in Jesus as their God and saviour and officials to sign a more comprehensive statement of belief.

The declaration which members have to sign includes the phrase: "In joining this union, I declare my faith in Jesus Christ as my Saviour, my Lord and my God". The Guild of Students President Jemma Percy said the requirement to sign the declaration meant "participation in the society was not open to every student".

This is clearly a case where the individualistic regime of tolerance has over stretched itself to the point of self-contradiction, undermining freedom of association.

Petition Blair

There is a new way of petitioning Prime Minister Blair called e-petitioning . I discovered this through a “rule of law” petition set up by Alan Storkey saying “We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to observe the rule of law by reinstating the BAE- Saudi Arabia criminal investigation by the SFO”.
Among the most popular petitions are:
"We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to scrap the proposed introduction of ID cards."
and
"We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to champion the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by not replacing the Trident nuclear weapons system."

Monday, January 01, 2007

Launch of New Institute



This summer Jonathan Chaplin left his position at the Institute for Christian Studies in Toronto to become director of the Kirby Laing Institute for Christian Ethics in Cambridge, England. The institute is having its official launch on 24th January with Chaplin giving his inaugural leture ‘Speaking From Faith in Democracy’. Despite Cambridge being a simple train journey from where I live in London, 5pm on a Wednesday is not possible. I hope that future events may be at a more workable time.

Happy New Year!


Well it's been over a month since I last blogged, so it only seems appropriate to start the new year with a post. I certainly won't be revealing all my new years resolutions. However one that I have made is to try and reduce my ecological footprint (see here to find out yours). Since I don't drive a car there appear to be two main possibilities. One is to stop visiting my in-laws in Italy by plane, the other is to reduce the amount of meat I eat. I have decided to go for the second. Since I eat a fair amount of meat it will be both hard but possible. I know it probably sounds obvious but rather than cutting meat out of my diet I intend to increase the amount of vegetarian meals I eat and enjoy. Any suggestions welcome.

Thursday, November 23, 2006

What is the object of deconstruction? Derrida and Universality


A while back I posted some quotes on philsophy and universality. These had been promted by reading James Smith's book on Derrida. Here are some belated thoughts on Derrida and universality.
There is an interesting, and perhaps not unequivocal relationship between Derrida’s earlier and later work with respect to the philosophical problematics of individuality/particularity and universality. It is of cause fashionable to talk of later and earlier periods in a philosopher’s thought, obvious examples being Heidegger and Wittgenstein, and Derrida has not escaped such division in his corpus. There often follows, after the early/late thesis has established itself, a defence of the unity within the development of the given philosophers thought. James Smith’s Jacque Derrida Live Theory presents such a defence using the theme of “the Other” as the interpretive key to the continuity at the heart of Derrida’s work. Nevertheless I will use Smiths exposition as a starting point for exploring the Derrida’s relation to the issue of universality in Philosophy which suggests, at the very least, an intriguing shift.

Derrida’s early critiques of Husserl and logocentrism focuses on the way that philosophy has historically excluded materiality in favour of the spiritual/rational. In particular when dealing with language philosophy has conceived it in terms of writing (as material) in opposition to speech which is thought of as more spiritual. Derrida challenges this by showing how what is excluded or denigrated in philosophical discourse - materiality in the form here of language and history - is actually a necessary condition for what philosophy elevated, purity given here as geometrical thought. So in his introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry Derrida writes:

“Whether geometry can be spoken about is not, the extrinsic and accidental possibility of a fall into the body of speech or of a slip into a historical movement … The paradox is that, without the apparent fall back into language and thereby into history, a fall which would alienate the ideal purity of sense, sense would remain an empirical formation imprisoned as fact in a psychological subjectivity – in the inventors head. Historical incarnation sets free the transcendental, instead of binding it (IHOG, 77)” (quoted in Smith p.24)

In other words pure universality (absolute ideal objectivity) is deconstructed on the basis of a materiality which reasserts itself within a philosophical system that seeks to exclude it, and does so “as the very condition of possibility of what philosophy want” viz. pure objectivity (Smith p.25).

Later Smith discusses Derrida’s turn to issues of ethics, justice, hospitality and religion. Here Derrida turns deconstruction in the opposite direction criticising current particular configurations (i.e. “the fall back … into history”) of justice, hospitality, and so on, in the name of a pure, unconditional, undeconstructible justice, hospitality etc. This gives Derrida’s ethics a Kantian feel to it in its formalism. So Derrida talks of ‘the formality of a structural messianism’ that is without messianism, “an idea of justice – which we distinguish from law or right or even human rights – and an idea of democracy – which we distinguish from its current concept and from its determined predicates today” (Spectres of Marx 59 quoted in Smith p.86). “This critique” that Derrida’s project of deconstruction is now engaged in “belongs to the movement of an experience open to the absolute future of what is coming, that is to say, a necessarily indeterminate, abstract, desert-like experience that is confided, exposed, given up to its waiting for the other and for the event” (SM, 90 quoted pp.87-88).

This suggests an important shift, paradoxical perhaps. Where at first Derrida seems to target ideas of purity, of absolutes beyond any materiality, because their condition of possibility involves determinate materiality, later it is this determinate materiality that becomes the focus of deconstruction because there is always the future to come. If it could be said that early Derrida held that “purity is always deconstructible,” Derrida’s later claim is that “content … is always deconstructible” (SM, 90 quoted p.87)

Saturday, November 18, 2006

Vollenhoven's Problem-Historical Method


I have been meaning to post something on Vollenhoven's "Consequent Problem-Historical Method" for a long time. Since this post by Gideon Strauss to be exact. One of the things that has delayed this is I wanted to take seriously the criticism that Vollenhoven's method is a mere "pigeon-holing" exercise. I could just quote Seerveld, one of Vollenhoven's students who has creatively employed his method. He writes:
"The objection to Vollenhoven's "pigeon-holing" complex philosophies misunderstands his problem-historical methodology, which is deeply concessive toward all manner of thinkers from a radically christian standpoint: every slanted philosophy, from whatever "bad" neighbourhood it operates, is wrestling with God's world and cannot help but uncover matters God's children may also need to notice and realign within our own servant (not "master"!) narrative being written" ("Christian Aesthetic Bread for the World" Philosophia Reformata 2001 no.2)
I think Seerveld makes a good point, but it will only make sense when we see more analysis like his own "Pedagogical Strength" article and less like Vollenhoven's elaborate charts, meaningless to all but a few experts. I doubt the following will do much to amend this situation, but I post it anyway.
Those who would see Vollenhoven’s method as ripe for re-evaluation face the difficulty of several overlapping complexities. First and most obvious is the 80 odd conceptions and 60 odd time-currents. Secondly is that both types and time-currents, not being a priori, undergo modification and sometimes, thought not always, connected with this is that Vollenhoven's interpretation of individual thinkers also undergoes revision.

Just a cursory glance at the Schematische Kaarten (2000) raises a number of such issues: different versions of the same chart, names crossed out, names with question marks next to them, names in brackets etc. This means that the various Vollenhoven material now available do not all match up (especially the Runner translation). Bril has helpfully annotated the Kort Overzich (1956) and other material in the Vollenhoven translations to highlight these changes.

To go back a little to the types/currents complexity. 80times60=4800, the Schematische Kaarten has about 1,600 thinkers charted. So if we are to get anywhere in understanding the CPHM we have to start to simplify. There seems to be two options. The first is to follow Wolters "grid" example which gives equal weight to the three main problems (Myth/non-myth, monism/dualism, Universal/individual) and so gives us 18 conceptions. However Vollenhoven seems to order things differently, giving us a second option. A philosophers conception concerning the "vertical structure of the kingdoms" is approached according to four problems, to quote:


[1] In the first place one must consider whether someone has approached the intended structure via myth, or whether one has considered structure (while rejecting myth as a source of philosophy) in a cosmogonic-cosmological or purely cosmological way. [2] Fur­thermore there is the question of dualism and monism. In other words, one can think that everything is based on the eternal correlation of the transcendent and the non-transcendent, such that any unity must be explained in connection to these two categories with the result that unity is derivative. Alternatively, one can postulate that everything is at bottom a unity and consequently that any difference must be ascribed to divergence. [3] In the third place there is the problem of the vertical relationship, in dualism between the transcendent and the non-transcendent, and in monism between the higher and lower species of the original unity. [4] Finally we must determine the site within which a dualist posits the boundary between the transcendent and the non-transcendent, and in which the monist posits the single origin of everything. ("conservatism and progressiveness in Philosophy" 1959)

What we can notice is that the third "dimension" of the box is missing and is replaced by further refinement of problems arising out of the monism-dualism problematic. However this is not quite true as the issue of partial-universalism comes back, with a vengeance, in purely cosmological dualism in its attempts to solve the third problem of relating the higher and the lower. Working down these four problems then gives us, if I have worked it out correctly, 27 main types.

Sunday, November 12, 2006

Bob Goudzwaard and Climate Change



WYSOCS are putting on a day conference featuring Bob Goudzwaard and Sir John Houghton called Climate Change and Global Economy Bob Goudzwaard has developed a critique of goal-orientated action. In an interview with Bruce Wearne he says:
“As a Christian I worry about extreme goal-orientation dominating our lives, as if our self-set goals produce ‘meaning’ for our lives. Meaning does not originate from self-chosen goals, but from walking on God-given ways, like the way of love, peace, justice and stewardship.”
“… all too easily we assume that self-generated growth is the way ahead. But if we see ourselves as ‘the people of the way’ we see themselves as sent on our way - in our Western liberal culture we are told that we need to send ourselves, to keep on extending ourselves further and further, pushing the limits of our comfort zones. Such growth is idolatrous. ‘People of the Way’, on the other hand, implies a relativity of all self-set targets, and that includes the targets of growth and development. It is God who has sent us on His way”
Bob Goudzwaard spoke on Uprooting Poverty this time last year at WYSOCS where he outlined a proposal based on The Way and The Spirit. Andrew Basden has written a short review here where he summarizes thus:
“Goals have become our nemesis. We would do better to substitute for our goal-oriented solutions (so much change by 2015 A.D.) a step-by-step orientation to "The Way". Each step would be a re-alignment to the norms of justice and care in obedience to God. We shall find horizons open out as we do so. Today we are powerless to change this evil system - but the Holy Spirit, who comes to convict and heal, does occasionally destroy whole systems that enslave (e.g. Apartheid). Let us pray, and cast ourselves on God's salvation.”
I am sorry not to be able to attend what is sure to be an excellent event. If you are able to get there do.

Tuesday, November 07, 2006

Danielson: a Family Movie

'Danielson: a Family Movie' is being shown at Grace Church Hackney on Sunday 26th November, 8pm (Doors 7.30pm). Free Entry (with a whip round for the director). According to the flyer it is
a documentary about unbridled creativity vs. accessibility, Christian faith vs. popular culture, underground music vs. survival, and family vs. individuality. The film follows Daniel Smith, an eccentric musician and visual artist, as he leads his four siblings and best friend to indie-rock stardom, mentoring the then unknown Sufjan Stevens along the way. The Danielson Family performs in white nurse costumes to symbolize the healing power of the Good News, a recurring subject matter. Though tepidly received by the Christian music world, they are widely embraced by the mainstream independent music community. Highly recommended viewing for anyone interested/involved in music or art business, even if you’ve never heard of Danielson.
There is a review of the film here.

Wednesday, November 01, 2006

Blessings and Humour



I guess we reformationals are not well known for our vivacious good humour, but there was plenty of laughs in Leeds and this photo gives a sense of how much we genuinely enjoyed our time together. Two of my favourite moments came from very dead pan, and self-effacing response by Steve Bishop to a question about his presentation, and Gareth Jones' magical realist account of his spiritual journey from mountain top epiphany in Wales to Dooyeweerdian philosophy in Manchester.
As to the title, I've used this as an occassional alternative to the more traditional "God Bless" at the end of an e mail. I was told Bob Goudzwaard often uses it and I think its wonderful. We reformationals need to be all about blessings and humour.