Thursday, September 27, 2018

John Bolt on Reformational Philosophy

Kyle Dillion has written a summary and response to John Bolt's "Doubting Reformational anti-Thomism" a chapter in Aquinas Among the Protestants.

Bolt has also criticised Dooyeweerd in his review "An Adventure in Ecumenicity: A Review Essay of Berkouwer and Catholicism by Eduardo Echeverria". Below is the response I wrote to that piece. It was first published on the now defunct reformational scholarship blog.

John Bolt’s “An Adventure in Ecumenicity” is billed as a review of Berkouwer and Catholicism by Eduardo Echeverria, however, it is both more and less than that. It is less since we do not find out much about Echeverria’s book! Of the 14 pages of the review only three paragraphs actually reference the book and they are largely used to introduce his main target: Herman Dooyeweerd and reformational philosophy (who nevertheless are nowhere directly quoted). It is more since the main purpose of the review, so it appears, is to express the annoyance and dissatisfaction with what he, from his North American context, has experienced as reformational philosophy. And further the rejection of natural theology that first struck him as problematic in his Seminary days of studying Berkouwer (77).

His criticism of Dooyeweerd and reformational philosophy is that they subscribed to “progressive biblicism,” a term he borrows from Valentijn Hepp who had criticised Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven in these terms during the 1930s. For Bolt, this progressive biblicism in its “most gentle and kind” form “gives full respect to the confessions in general but bypasses them on a few key doctrines where it judges to have found a more biblical approach. It appeals to the Bible but does not take very seriously the full tradition of the church on these points, preferring to go its own way. Included among these doctrines are the body/soul duality and the continued existence of the soul after death.” (85). Despite being the most gentle and kind form it nevertheless evinces, according to Bolt, an “individualistic approach to Scripture” (86 quoting Hepp), that lacks “the most basic level of Christian humility” (87). It also falls into “a serious epistemological blunder” in trying to use the Bible to “produce a pure biblical philosophy” (88). This progressive Biblicism produced, in the circle of reformational philosophy, a “Biblicism of infinite regress”.  Bolt describes this over four points. First Kuyper and Bavinck are praised by Dooyeweerd for breaking with certain scholastic tendencies, but secondly this break is considered incomplete and so further criticism and philosophical revision is required. Thirdly Cornelius Van Til repeats the first two moves with respect to Dooyeweerd; praise for his move away from certain philosophical notions but criticism that he has not gone far enough. Finally Dooyeweerd “returns the favour, and the disciples of the two men continue the process ad infinitum, ad nauseum, all in the name of finding the true, biblical or reformational philosophy” (87).

While Bolt has other complaints against Dooyeweerd, such that his interpretation and criticism of Thomas Aquinas (and Catholic thought in general) has been thoroughly invalidated, and that his philosophy is a symptom of a misguided de-hellenizing project, I think the above fairly summarises his main concern in this review.

We shall work backwards through the objections and complaints against Dooyeweerd. So the first thing to say is that nowhere does Dooyeweerd, or any other reformational philosophy, ever claim that they are seeking to establish “the true, biblical or reformational philosophy”. In the preface to his magnum opus De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee translated and revised in the 1950s as A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (NC), Dooyeweerd is emphatic that the Christian Idea of science “is not a matter of a ‘system’ (subject to all the faults and errors of human thought) but rather it concerns the foundation and the root of scientific thought as such” (NC I. viii). Elsewhere he writes, “The first systematic statement of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in my book of that title is truly not meant to be a conclusion. It is a modest first attempt at a systematic Calvinist philosophy” (quoted in Verburg 2015, 252). In 1973 he was asked what reformational philosophy would look like in fifty years time, Dooyeweerd replied “That I don’t know. It is possible that it will have disappeared. And I would not mind that, if it had indeed done its work” (Verburg, 483). The point here is that Dooyeweerd sought to discover the religious root of theoretical thinking to show that an intentionally and integrally Christian philosophy could be possible. He consistently distinguished between this religious root, which is pre-theoretical and is a driving force in our thinking, and the theoretical development of philosophical problems which is fallible and subject to the standards for coherent and meaningful philosophy.

When we understand this purpose we can see that what is essential is the foundation or root of philosophy, and it is here where “something permanent can be achieved” that is “with respect to the actualization of the idea concerning an inner reformation of philosophy” (NC I, ix). This task of “an inner reformation of philosophy” is ongoing and never finished. Does this imply an infinite regress? No, because it is no different from the ongoing task of systematic theology to be submitting itself to the final authority of scripture and to articulate the doctrines of the church afresh for each generation. We can also see that Dooyeweerd was not trying to derive a true philosophy from the Bible as Bolt seems to suggest. Indeed Dooyeweerd wrote, “The divine Word-revelation gives the Christian as little a detailed life- and worldview as a Christian philosophy, yet it gives to both simply their direction from the starting-point in their central basic motive. But this direction is really a radical and integral one, determining everything.” (NC I, 128). It is interesting that Bolt’s solution to the problem of a Christian approach in the sciences is that we should judge whether a particular approach is “consistent with or at odds with biblical teaching” (88). This appears to be a rather external view of the role of religion in science and is a significant step back from how he describes the Roman Catholic view as developed by the nouvelle theologie theologians “who insisted that human reason always operates within a teleology of belief and unbelief” (80).

Nevertheless Bolt seems to want to side-step the question as to whether a doctrine such as the substantiality and immortality of the soul is “consistent with or at odds with biblical teaching” since that could lead to bypassing the confessions on a few key doctrines. Instead Christian thinkers must align themselves “philosophically with the Augustinian/Thomistic tradition of Christian metaphysics” (89) or condemn themselves to the charge of “lacking the most basic level of Christian humility” (87).


Saturday, September 22, 2018

(24) Sensory perception

Dooyeweerd explains the modal subject-object relation as a coordination between a subject-function and object-function within the same law-sphere where the subject-function is the active pole and the object-function the passive pole (NC, II 370).  As an example we can point to the objective sensory image of space given on the retina as a result of the impression made by light.  It is an image which is only two-dimensional.  It becomes three-dimensional only in coherence with our total subjective feeling of space which involves not only the space of sight, but also that of touch, and to a certain extent hearing.  This in turn depends on the organic coherence of our sense organs (NC II 373).  In a similar way the modal functions of number, movement, energy and organic life can become objectified in sensory perception, this possibility is guaranteed by the way the modal spheres cohere together in reality.

It is important to note that what is objectified in sensory perception is not fully given to it, number, space etc. are not sensory in character, further what is perceived is not purely an object but also a subject.  This means that, for example, a plant functions actively in the modes of number, space, movement, energy and organic life, and it does so in its own particular way.  Dooyeweerd also gives the example of a biotic subject-object relation of a mother-bird feeding its young.  He uses this to show how such a biotic subject-object relation can itself become the object of sensory perception and so be involved in a sensory subject-object relation (NC, II 374).

A natural event, such as a flood, cannot function actively in the mode of feeling, it cannot perceive anything, but it can be perceived.  This is what is meant by being an object for sensory perception.  Such events can function as objects in all the later modes, so it can have a historical meaning, it can have an economic meaning and so on.  This meaning does not exist “in itself” but only in relation to possible subjective functioning in the aspect concerned, Dooyeweerd explains, “The objective-sensory perceptual image of a flash of lightening, for instance, only exists in relationship to possible subjective perception.  It has no being “in itself,” in abstraction.” (ESL, I 185).  Traditionally a distinction between primary and secondary qualities has been maintained where the mathematical and physical characteristics of a natural phenomenon are held to be in the thing itself whereas the sensory qualities of colour, smell, taste etc. are supposed to exist only for subjective perception and so lack any true ‘objectivity’ (in the sense of mind independent reality).  Dooyeweerd’s approach rejects this completely.  On his view a natural phenomenon functions actively, and so as a subject, in the mathematical and physical aspects of reality. As a subject, it truly possesses a spatial trajectory, it functions actively as a subject within the physical aspect of movement and energy.  It is the sensory qualities that are instead “objective” because related as an object to the active functioning of a subject.  The origin of the traditional view is the supposition that investigation by the special sciences is able to inform us with regard to the true and full reality of a phenomenon.  However Dooyeweerd holds that “the special sciences must in fact begin by abstracting from the concrete data in order to be able to theoretically study a particular aspect of reality which has been chosen as a field of investigation.  The special sciences should never arrogate to themselves the theory of reality.  This lies in principle outside the limits of their competency” (ESL, I. 186).

There is an important difference between the objective retrocipations and the objective anticipation in sensory perception.  The first are simply and directly given, those with normal vision in enough light cannot help but see these features, in the latter case however the features relate to normative aspects of reality as such they require the opening or deepening of the objective perceptual image.  “The normative anticipations in the objective-sensory form of a thing are dependent upon human disclosure; they are not present as a matter of course in the perceptual image itself … but are, rather, presented to human beings as a hidden realm of meaning to be disclosed.” (ESL. I 193)

Reformational philosophy emphasises the relational nature of all that exists. There are no 'things in themselves'. It is a mistake to see a basic relationship between thinking and being, rather 'thinking' is just one function next to and in relationship with others as the logical aspect is just one aspect in connection with all the others. And all aspects are aspects of coherence, both in terms of subject-subject relations and subject-object relations.
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Sunday, September 16, 2018

(23) The Subject-object relation

The distinction between a “reality in itself” opposed to “appearances” is as old as philosophy itself.  This is to be expected since theoretical thinking gives us a view of reality quite different from our ordinary experience.  As soon as theory gets going one has to consider how these two views relate.  We exist within the world as an active participant shaping and being shaped by the relationships given to us and into which we enter.  Our experience is not primarily of isolated objects or dimensions but of an indissoluble coherence of a rich variety of facets which impress themselves on us, or recede from our consciousness depending on our concerns and interests at each moment.  First the ray of sunlight, or the sound of an alarm clock, that wakes us from sleep, our thoughts organizing the priorities of the day, the cost of utilities as we read the latest bill.  While each of these experiences has a certain focus, say the economic dimension of the gas bill, nevertheless each experience displays a coherence of many dimensions.  The bill is in a language we understand, set out spatially at the size appropriate to our perceptual capacities that only function by virtue of the continuing health of our bodies as a living organism and so on.  Our experience of reality then can be described as an integral coherence of a rich diversity of aspects or modes of being.  We do not experience any of these aspects on their own, we have no experience of a purely economic reality for example, but neither do we experience pure space, or pure movement.  It is only in theoretical thought that reality appears split us.  The integral character of reality and our place within it become replaced as the focus of our attention with a deliberately chosen, that is not real, opposition between our act of thought and its object of analysis.

However it might be objected that there seems to be something wrong in this analysis for surely there are many things in this world that lack features that have been identified as part of human experience.  For example moral worth, or economic value, even perception of colour and taste, cannot be seen to inhere in reality.  Such things have a first-person ontology.  This view comes from an understanding of nature that arose from the development of modern science where reality is approached exclusively in terms of its physical aspect of mechanical motion, and later that of energy, so that all natural phenomenon must be understood within these terms.  A classic example is Galileo’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of a thing.

The subject-object distinction is usually understood as a structural relation where the subject stands opposite the object as two independent elements of reality.  In terms of what we have already said this means that the subject-object distinction takes the opposition between our act of thought and the object of analysis it has chosen, through abstraction, to be a real opposition between two separate entities instead of a deliberately chosen stance or attitude.  So both sides of the relation, the analytic focus of our thinking and the object of analysis, are artificial and not simply given in reality.  We can, however, speak of a natural subject-object relation which crosses over the whole diversity of meaning rather than cutting it in two.  In this sense we should understand the term ‘subjective’ as relating to the active side of a connection while ‘objective’ relates to the passive side.  This distinction refers to concrete reality rather than to the modal aspects so it is not the case that certain aspects are passive whereas others are active, as is the case with Kant’s opposition between the spontaneity of the understanding (Reason) and the passivity of the forms of intuition (senses). The term subject has the meaning of a thing which makes something happen. This means that by its own nature it brings about some possibilities which are available through the functioning of some modal aspect. In this sense objective refers to when such possibilities are actualised in a thing by some other creature. When a rock is crafted into a beautiful diamond and sold human activity realises passive aesthetic and economic functions of the rock making it an aesthetic and economic object. Since many creatures, and not just humans, make things happen, there can therefore be many different kinds of subject-object connections.

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Saturday, September 08, 2018

(22) Modal aspects as universal law spheres

All the modes are universal in character, this is important to understand if we are to see how the modal spheres help explain coherence as well as diversity.  If we look back at the diagram we can see this universal character in the way that the modes stretch across things horizontally.  The implication is that all concrete entities function in all the modes.  

This raises an immediate question: surely trees and stones do not function in all the modes?  It is such a question that tempts us to separate the world into two spheres of object and subject.  We could think here of Descartes dualism between the thinking mind as the knowing subject separate from the physical world of matter, or of Locke’s mind filled with sensations caused by the external material world.  Against this reformational philosophy offers an original and unique perspective on the subject-object distinction using the theory of the modal aspects (see the next section).  We can best understand this if we first look at “object-functions”.

When we analyse a tree we can see how it functions actively in the first five modes of being, however we should also notice that we perceive and analyse the tree, we can admire the beauty of the tree, or assess its economic value.  The existence of the tree is therefore not shut off from our perceiving and logical functioning. While it is true that trees do not perceive and reason they can be perceived and reasoned about.  This means that despite not functioning in an active way within the sensitive and analytical aspects, they do function passively in relation to human perception and analysis.  These are what we call the trees object-functions. 

What this shows is that the modal aspects make relations possible; my perceiving relation towards the tree is possible because we both exist within the sensitive modal aspect.  The modal laws therefore constitute relationships of coherence. I as an active perceiving subject relate to the tree as a perceived object.

Rene Descartes' dualist view has shaped the way philosophers think about our knowledge of the world and leads them to ask the question: how can we as knowing subjects come to know the “external world”.  Notice that while reformational philosophy can speak of a coherence between the knowing subject and her environment the common philosophical tendency to speak of the “external world” creates a separation between the two and sets up the classic, and irresolvable, problem of how we can defeat the sceptic and show we can have knowledge of the world.  Such a way of putting the problem clearly does not do justice to the fact that both knower and known exist in the same world and function within the same modal spheres.   We can see that a reformational analysis of the subject-object relations shows the mistaken nature of this way of framing the problem of knowledge.  Rather than a gap that must be bridged from a knowing subject to a known object, we have a genuine relationship between the two through a whole array of irreducible modes.  The passive functions really belong to the nature of the object and are not mere subjective add-ons.  The object does not exist “in itself”, separate from us, as the German philosopher Immanuel Kant thought, but in relations, we can only take an object out of these relations in an act of thought as an abstraction. 
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Saturday, September 01, 2018

(21) Time and the modal aspects


A number of reformational philosophers, including Dooyeweerd in his early phase, considered the possibility that time is one of the modal aspects. However a number of considerations have persuaded most that this is not a viable option. One is that if time were a separate modality, then the other modal spheres would both presuppose this time modality, and would no longer be thought of as integrally temporal in character. Secondly we would need to understand the specific, irreducible character of time, what is its kernel meaning, what would be the analogies with other modal aspects? A further point is that the close connection between time and reality helps us understand the integral coherence of reality which can be understood to be guaranteed by the continuity of time. A final point is that while it is common to think of time as physical time, or in other words clock time that can be measured, we can instead view time as cosmic and so manifesting itself in all the modal aspects. We now look at how time is expressed in each of the modal aspects.

Numbers have a natural sequential order so that in counting we go “successively” from small to large. Smaller numbers are earlier in this progression, whereas larger numbers come later. All this points to the temporal order of numbers. 

The nucleus of the spatial aspect is continuous extension. Shapes and geometric figures can only exist if all their parts are present at the same time. Here time manifests itself in the notion of simultaneity.

Kinematic: Time linked with motion; no motion exists without physical time. This order of motion is reversible. Here time manifests itself as continuous flow.

Physical: Time in the physical aspect manifests itself as irreversible since it deals with energy transfer.  Here we find the sequential order of cause and effect.

Biotic: Here time is expressed through processes of growth, maturity, decline and death. Whereas in the earlier modal aspects there is a fixed pace to processes, in the biotic aspect these processes can take place over different speeds.  Some animals and plants have a short life span, whereas others much longer. The biotic process is characterised by development and decline, there is a progression of germination, growth, maturation, ageing and dying.

Psychical: The discrepancy with physical time can before even more accentuated in emotional time which depends on our mood, tense, bored, excited, engaged, absorbed etc.. Here time can fly or drag on endlessly.

Logical: Here time is expressed in the starting points, premises and presuppositions of our thinking and arguing. In a logical argument the conclusion must follow from the premises in a logically sound way.

Historical: we measure the generational forming of culture with reference to periods, and to features such as progress and regress. In understanding historical develop we often have need of biotic analogies (maturation, flourishing, decline etc.), however these are always in relation to human formative power and so articulate themselves in terms of reforming or revolutionary, conservative or reactionary and so on. Being ahead of your time, or stuck in the past.

Aesthetic: involves both the changing fashions as well as more lasting styles. Tempo, rhythm and pace of change is important. Is it too slow allow new (imaginative possibilities) or is it too fast to allow nuance and ramifications to disclose themselves.

Symbolic: Grammatical tenses, the use of punctuation.

Social: Priority in social relationships. Who has priority in different social situations, the youngest sibling in a game of cards, the chairman in opening the meeting, old people for seats on the bus and so on.

Economic: The role of interest, periodic increments in wages or salary to express the value of experience.  Efficiency and wasting time, spending time wisely etc.

Juridical time: Prison terms, leases, terms of office.

Ethical: the urgency to put right a relationship before the end of the day as scripture recommends. The time it takes for trust to develop in a friendship.

Faith: the alternation of festival days and ordinary time. Liturgy. Hope and expectation.

In seeing time expressed through all the modal spheres we achieve a view of time close to our experience of time.  The rhythm of day and night is not just physical but tied into our biotic clock and psychological experience as shown in experiments where this rhythm is denied, or in the experience of jet lag.  You visit somewhere quaint on holiday and say “my, hasn’t time stood still here”.
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Saturday, August 25, 2018

(20) What is time?


Before we look more at relations it is worth pausing to note that relations always exist in time. This leads us to a perennial philosophical question. “What is time?” asked Augustine, “If nobody asks me I know; but if I want to explain it to somebody who asks, I do not know” (Confessions 11.14). This well-known comment on time points us to an intriguing phenomenon. On the one hand, time is our natural element. We are immersed in time. We experience the passing of hours, days and years, and of the countless changes that take place in them. We remember past times and have a sense of expectancy for what the future holds, all the time dealing with the pressing concerns of the present. Everything that exists in reality, every state of affairs, is involved in a course of events, in a process of be-coming and be-going. We name this coming and going transience and acknowledge its pervasiveness.

On the other hand, when we begin to think theoretically about time, when we seek to grasp it in a concept, the mystery of time highlighted by Augustine returns. We can see this if we start by asking what is the present. Augustine himself raised this issue by asking whether the present is so instantaneous as to be practically non-existent. No sooner have we pointed to this moment now, then it has gone into the past. Andre Troost has helpfully discussed the issues this raises. He writes “[i]n this … approach the present is comparable to a mathematical point without extension, an imaginary point that moves continuously towards the future, but remains always, at least in theory, suspended between past and future. In the moment of the “now” the past perpetually moves up towards the future, which becomes the past in almost the same moment. In this theory, the “now” has in effect become a shadowy nothing, a pure idea and no longer a reality.”  This naturally leads to doubt about the reality of time since if the present does not exist then neither does the past or future. Time is understood as a succession of point-like nothings. And a thousand times nothing is still nothing. This idea of time as a sequence of “nows” also means that time loses both its datability and significance, for how can one ‘now’ be any different from any other? Despite the familiarity we seem to have with time, in this approach it has become detached from my practical activities and concerns.

What should we do, faced with this conundrum? Should we stick to what we experience of the reality of time, or should we follow the argument where it leads and accept that time is unreal? I hope that by now you will be ready to identify that the problem arises from failing to acknowledge and take stock of the fact that in our reasoning we have lifted time out of the context of cosmic reality. By isolating time as something in and of itself, we have turned it into nothing. It is important to repeat that our ability to abstract elements of our experience is very good and helpful, but its limits need to be carefully acknowledged. In particular it is important to be aware of what we are doing. Now in our attempt to understand time better through theoretical abstraction, we discover that it is intimately interwoven with cosmic reality. This is evident in the way that abstraction takes us away from time just as it takes us further from cosmic reality in its fullness. As Troost concludes, “Not a single atom of reality exists apart from time, and literally everything in our concrete experience of reality has a specific duration, is involved in the all-pervasive and all-encompassing “flow” of time, in short: exists in time.”

The cosmos is fundamentally temporal.  That is the position of reformational philosophy. Despite what might seem like an overemphasis on structures in our analysis so far, it would be a mistake to think that reformational philosophy sees reality as static or in structuralistic terms.  Dooyeweerd understood his theory of time to be central to his philosophy and went as far as to say that “The idea of cosmic time constitutes the basis of the philosophical theory of reality in this book.” (NC I.28).   Cosmic reality is fundamentally dynamic and temporal: “all structures of temporal reality,” he wrote, “are structures of cosmic time” (NC I 105).  Such a position places reformational philosophy in a critical relation towards those philosophical positions, dating back to Parmenidies, that view reality in purely structural terms and see time and change as negative characteristics of our experience of the world.

We have seen how the modal aspects, although mutually irreducible, are inter-dependent; they presuppose and refer to each other.  Every modal aspect contains within its modal structure a reference to all other aspects and so cannot be understood outside of this unbreakable coherence of meaning. The coherence of reality is a “temporal order and connection of all the aspects” which is expressed by the anticipations of the earlier aspects to the later aspects and the retrocipations of the later aspects to the earlier (NC II.49-54).  This referring forwards and backwards is indicative of, and expresses, the meaning character of reality.
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Wednesday, August 22, 2018

(19) Diversity and Coherence between the modes


There is a danger that modal aspects are viewed as parts that make up reality, however this is not accurate.  Reality does not split up into 15 separate sections like a cake.  Here it is important to repeat that the special sciences investigate their object through the perspective of a modal aspect, they do not investigate the modal aspect itself.  We now need to say something about how each aspect is intimately related to all the others.  This can be done by introducing the notion of analogies.  Through analogies each aspect refers to all the others.  

We can distinguish two types of analogies, those modes that are earlier than other modes can refer towards the later modes, this is called anticipations, and the later modes refer back to the earlier modes in retrociptations.

The first modal aspect is that of number whose meaning is found in discrete quantity as expressed in so called rational or natural numbers.  The spatial aspect is irreducible to that of number, nevertheless in irrational numbers we find an anticipation of spatial figures within the numeric modal aspect.  For example Ï€.

In referring to the number of dimensions in space we find an intrinsic element of space that refers back to that of number, this is a retrocipation.  The notion of causality, which finds its origins in the physical aspect, is an analogical concept that has its place in the different modes of experience: we talk of historical causality while resisting a reduction to the physical kind of causality.  Likewise we require a notion of legal causality in order to hold a criminal legally accountable for their crime, a notion of logical ground to move from premises to conclusion and so on.

These analogies are very important when interpreting theories and concepts within the different disciplines.  The religious impulse to find the meaning and coherence of our world from within this world leads inevitably to reductionist views of the nature and character of the diversity we experience.  In their conceptual expression these reductionist views continually distort the analogical character of our concepts which leads to serious theoretical problems and paradoxes.

Examples in modern sociology

Aspects
Analogies in social aspect
One-sided emphasis
Sign Aspect
Social symbolism and interpretation
Symbolic
interactionism/Post-modernism
Historical Aspect
Social power, control and authority
Historicism/Post-modernism
Logical Aspect
Social identification and distinction
Social consensus and conflict theories
Sensitive-psychical Aspect
Social sensitivity/solidarity
Psychologistic approaches
Biotical Aspect
Social differentiation and integration
Organicistic trends/ Functionalism
Physical Aspect
Social change and dynamics
Physicalistic trends
Kinematical Aspect
Social constancy/persistence
Status quo trends
Spatial Aspect
Social totality/wholes and parts
Universalism/holism – emphasis on systems and sub-systems
Arithmetical Aspect
Social unity in multiplicity
Individualism/society as a collection of individual actors

Source D.F.M. Strauss Reintegrating Social Theory p.11
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Sunday, August 12, 2018

(18) Outline of the modal spheres


In this section we will give a brief outline of each of the modal aspects, however it is important to make one final point.  The modal spheres are not just abstract categories of what exists as if what exists lack any intrinsic meaning or value. Modern thought has disenchanted the world into ‘bare facts’. Calvin Seerveld has expressed well that the modal aspects are channels of God’s love and blessing towards us and call us to a loving response. All the modal aspects find their unity in love. Here it is worth quoting Dooyeweerd at length:

“Man, created in the image of God, should direct all the temporal functions and powers of his existence and those of his whole temporal world unto the service of God. This he was to accomplish in the central unity of his ego by loving God above all.  And because, in the order of creation, every human ego in this central religious sense was united with every other human ego in a central communion of the service of God, the love for the neighbour was included in the love of God.  We cannot love God without loving His image, expressed in the ego of ourselves and that of our fellow-men.  Therefore, the entire divine Law for God’s creation displays its radical unity in the central commandment of love, addressed to the heart … Just as all the aspects of our temporal experience and existence find their central reference point in the human ego, so the commandment of love represents the central unity of all God’s different ordinances for the temporal world” (Dooyeweerd Twilight, 123)


As we have said before a great danger facing Christianity is the view that this world is a passing and insignificant phase before the soul is taken to heaven.  In contrast we must affirm that we cannot live close to God if we deny God’s creation.  We serve God not alongside or apart from creation, our service is here in our everyday lives in all we do (Colossians 3:12-25 esp vv.17 & 23).  The closer we move in genuine love to all God’s creatures, the closer we come to God’s self.  And the closer to God, the more we will be concerned about his world – a world which He loved so much that his own Son died for it to be redeemed.

It is important to be reminded that human beings never act on a modal aspect as such.  Human acts are always concrete acts within relationships and institutions and upon things.  Modal aspects are always only aspects of concrete existents (things, events, and relationships).  This will be especially important later when we come to look at how to understand history and cultural development.

Here are the modal spheres identified by Dooyeweerd with the nuclear moments in brackets.

Numeric (discrete quantity): The numeric aspect is the domain of magnitude and discrete quantity. It involves more or less, and is represented by numbers. When considering number there is no need to assume anything regarding any of the later modal aspects. Once humans take number into account as part of their responsibility we can speak of too much, too little, or the right amount.

Spatial (Continuous extension): This aspect is investigated by geometry. In the number of dimensions and the measurement of them we must presuppose number. Every part of space is connected in principle to every other as part of the whole hence ‘continuous extension’. The notions of ‘whole’, ‘part’ and ‘coherence’ find their home in the spatial aspect. Anticipating human responsibility things may be “out of place” or find their niche.

Kinematic (Movement): It is a dimension we can understand in terms of inertia: the tendency of matter to remain at rest, or, if moving, to keep moving in the same direction, unless affected by some outside force.

Physical (Energy): This involves forces and interaction. It is familiar to us in the phenomenon of mass, force, matter, atomic and molecular structure.

Biotic (Life): The primary dynamic functions of growth, reproduction, metabolism, restoration, birth, maturation. It involves the integration of a whole where all parts work together to generate growth and so continually generates and regenerates all its parts for its own continued development and existence. If the link with human responsibility and the realities of good and evil are less clear in the earlier modes at least here it makes sense to talk of health and disease, flourishing and decay, vigorous and frail.

Psychic/Sensitive (Feeling or Emotion): this is the mode of goal directed behaviour, in animals and humans, that is primarily of a sensitive (feeling, emotional) kind, includes drives, instinct, stimulus-response, and perception. Humans can be sensitive and well disposed, or insensitive and suffering.

Analytic/Logical (Analytic Distinction): [here or after the formative given that animals create artifacts, do they distinguish?] This mode has to do with the ability to distinguish and identify differences in their context, to identify and compare things. Animals are able to distinguish prey and predators, food etc. but they are unable to develop and formulate these distinctions into concepts where formative control and language is necessary. Humans maybe thoughtful and lucid, or scatterbrained and muddled.

Formative/Historical (Mastery or Control): The mode of freely making, crafting, creating, building, producing where choice and responsibility direct the forming. As it points back to the earlier modes it involves skill and mastery over objects. As it opens up to later modes it involves culture and history as the basis for communication and interaction with others. This is the origin of the means-ends relationship. Animals too make things, but only in the restrictive sense. Within the context of human cultural development there is the essential elements of creativity and responsibility. The development of science and technology in particular allow humans to design and make new things in order to better the world in far reaching and unexpected ways. In this way humans transcend the animal kingdom and make possible the disclosure of cultural forms such as language, education, the arts, society, market relations, juridical institution and so on. Skilful or incompetent.

Aesthetic (Harmony): Dooyeweerd placed this modal sphere after the economic and emphasized harmony, however Calvin Seerveld has long argued that the aesthetic dimension is better understood in terms of suggestion-rich, allusivity and imagination. As a consequence of this and a number of other consideration Seerveld places the aesthetic modal aspect after the formative mode and before the lingual mode. Imaginative or unimaginative.

Lingual/Sign (Symbolic Signification): symbolic signification and language. Clear or vague.

Social (Intercourse): Social intercourse where the consciously practiced developed and fostering of relationships is an end in itself. Hospitality and etiquette, politeness etc. Peaceful or quarrelsome.

Economic (Frugality): The stewardship of resources. Often in the context of scarcity where frugal use must be made or in the context of a wealth of possibilities where only a few can be realized. The optimal use of resources and talents, today often requiring a network of relationships providing for the exchange of goods and services. Prosperous or deprived, generous or greedy. 

Jural (retribution): The mode of rightly weighing what is due, the call for justice. Just or unjust.

Ethical/Trothic (Love): the mode of fidelity, loyalty, intimate care and concern. Loyal or disloyal.

Pistic/Faith (Certitude): Mode of faith, trust, certitude and surrender. Faith or unbelief.
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Friday, August 10, 2018

Calvin Seerveld on the Modal Spheres



"The modal laws have authority and give good, single, multisplendored direction for every creaturely thing because modal laws are prismatic variations of God’s covenanting Word, which says, “Love me above all, respect and build up your neighbour as yourself, and take care of all the creatures I have entrusted you people with until I come back to perfect my rule of shalom."



Calvin Seerveld Normative Aesthetics

Tuesday, August 07, 2018

(17) Basic features of the modal spheres

To understand modal aspects it is necessary to avoid the temptation to view these modes of how existents function, with the concrete existents of which they are aspects.  For example there is no “numerical” thing such as numbers, rather there are things, such as trees, fingers, people, art works, which can be counted and “numbered”. Probably the key feature of modal aspects is that they are mutually irreducible.  This is sometimes expressed as saying they are each sovereign in their own sphere which connects the philosophical theory of the modal aspects with Abraham Kuyper’s social philosophy of “sphere sovereignty”.  Their sovereignty consists in the fact that they are spheres of law.  Dooyeweerd writes “Every modal aspect of temporal reality has its proper sphere of laws, irreducible to those of other modal aspects, and in this sense it is sovereign in its own orbit” (NC. 1:102). The sphere sovereignty of each aspect is designated by a term that indicates the core meaning of the aspect.  This core meaning is referred to as the ‘nuclear moment’ or the ‘modal kernal’.  For example the modal kernel of the physical sphere is ‘energy’, the biotic sphere is ‘life’, these will be discussed more below.

Dooyeweerd gives a detailed analysis of the internal structure of the modal spheres.  He wants to show that the modal spheres are not externally related to each other but form an intimate coherence through their internal relation.  Each mode has a core nuclear moment which governs (as in sphere sovereignty) its irreducible character.

Around the core nuclear moments are ‘analogical moments’ which refer ahead to later modal aspects or back to earlier ones. These express the dynamic coherence between the modal spheres and will be discussed later (§19). They also indicate that the modal aspects exhibit an “order of succession”.  The idea is that ‘later’ aspects rest on, or are founded on, earlier aspects.  The first aspect is the numerical and this provides the foundation for the spatial aspect which could not exist without more than one dimension and involves extension which can be divided and so measured.  While spatiality is not reducible to number it is founded on number.  Another example is the biotic which rests on the physical mode.  This can be seen in that while there can be physical things which have no active biological functions it is impossible for biological phenomena to lack a physical basis.  Working through this direction we start with the numerical aspect and work our way up showing how each successive aspect presupposes those that preceded it.  This is called the foundational direction, however the cosmic ordering of the aspects can be viewed from the opposite “transcendental” direction.  From this perspective all the aspects point forward anticipating the later modal spheres and ultimately the faith aspect.  For example irrational numbers like Ï€ point forward to the spatial dimension of reality. This direction is also associated with the way each modal aspect is an expression of a deeper unity which is called the religious root of the cosmos. 

These points are not merely intricacies of Dooyeweerd’s, for example the foundational direction can help us to understand where philosophical naturalism has gone wrong.  Many today are convinced that nothing exists outside the areas studied by the natural sciences (physics, chemistry and biology).  On this view human thought and behaviour can be understood solely on the basis of what these sciences can tell us about the brain.  The claim is often made that ultimately everything can be explained in these terms.  Let it be noted that the term “ultimately” rightly reminds us of the religious character of such thinking. The theory of the modal aspects can help us see that scientific explanations are necessarily limited by the modal aspect through which they investigate reality.  This means that explanations of human thought and behaviour based on a chemical or biological analysis of the brain are always partial and circumstantial.  As indicated by the foundational direction they lay bare the basic conditions for events that occur at a higher level.  This means that it is always possible to find correlations between the higher levels of human action and the lower chemical and biological base.  However they can never lay bare the true meaning of events that occur at higher levels.  Human thinking must follow logical laws and not merely physical and biological laws.  Klapwijk has used the example of a lie detector which may help us tell if a person is lying, but it can never tell us why the suspect lies. We should be prepared to accept that neuroscience can be incredibly helpful in elucidating the complex correlations between processes of consciousness and brain activities, however no matter how much knowledge neurologists may have of the cerebral activities upon which consciousness depends, their view is always limited to the lower modal aspects.  As such they totally ignore the normative principles of consciousness, for example the logical principles of identity and contradiction, which consciousness must obey if its content is to be meaningful (See further §30).

It should be pointed out that although the theory of the modal spheres as outlined above follows Dooyeweerd’s version. His brother-in-law and co-worker in reformational philosophy, Dirk Vollenhoven, did not agree with his account of the ‘order of succession’ in terms of time with its foundational and transcendental directions. Also more recently Dirk Stafleu has commented that it is difficult to argue for the irreducibility of the modal aspects when focusing only on the term used to designate their core meaning.  Instead he suggests that it is more illuminating to focus on how existents relate to each other at the level of one modal aspect, or what are called the subject-subject relations within the modal sphere.  This is one of the reasons why has developed an approach in terms of ‘relation frames’ in the place of ‘modal aspects’.  As an example, he argues that if we recognise that all physical subject-subject relationships are expressions of energy interaction, then it becomes more obvious why physics cannot be reduced to mathematical relationships since triangles and numbers do not interact.  Again we can see that in the biotic aspect the subject-subject relation is one of genetic relationships of descent and heredity something that clearly does not exist in physical relationships.
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Monday, July 30, 2018

(16) The theory of modal spheres

We start with the theory of modal aspects.  First of all it is important to see that this is an attempt to understand reality; in other words the diversity to be investigated is a diversity that is to be found in reality and is not merely a question of what concepts we happen to choose or find useful.  The various ways reformational philosophers speak about modal aspects indicates this. Examples are: “aspects of reality”, “modes of being”, “modes of experience”.  Naturally any theory of these modal aspects necessarily involves concepts, and the diversity of concepts is both part of and reflects the diversity of reality.

A second point is it possible to refer to the diversity of reality in a very different way.  For example, the creation story in Genesis refers us to ‘the fish of the sea’, ‘the beasts of the earth’, ‘the birds of the air’ and so on.  Here we have a rich diversity of creatures, there is this creature and that creature.  Modal aspects are not a matter of ‘what’ there is, but of ‘how’ they exist, their ‘mode of existence’.  In the diagram we have indicated the reality of ‘what exists’ by the use of vertical columns.  The modes are the horizontal rows that express how these animals, entities and institutions exist.  You will notice that what exists always comes to expression through a number of modes.  In fact, we will later see how everything that exists asserts its being through all the modal aspects.

To get a better handle on some of these points, we can begin with how Herman Dooyeweerd, one of the pioneers of this theory, came to articulate his understanding of this diversity.  Dooyeweerd was trained in jurisprudence and after completing his doctoral studies he began to investigate, in the 1920’s, the main currents of the philosophy of law.  What he found was a number of theories that tried to explain law in terms of something other than law itself.  Some claimed that law was based on ethics, others that it was the result of social relations, still others that law could be explained in terms of logic.  Dooyeweerd was not satisfied with any of these solutions and instead started to develop his idea of irreducible diversity.  Each mode is distinct and cannot be reduced to another mode.

Dooyeweerd, and others since, have noticed similar issues arising in other sciences.  For example, in psychology the behaviourists reduced its perspective to the physical and biotic, whereas others reduced it to the social.  Mach reduced physics to observable sensations whereas Heisenberg reduced physics to mathematics.

A question naturally arises as to how reformational philosophy arrived at this list of 15 modal aspects.  The long answer would require an ongoing story that continues today involving much philosophical reflection and empirical considerations.  The list of aspects has always been treated as provisional and subject to further discussion and research.  In light of this we limit ourselves to three criteria that draw on what we have already covered.  Dooyeweerd’s assessment of legal theory suggests that a field of scientific investigation tends to take one or two modal aspects as the point of entry to the phenomena it studies.  This implies that different sciences can investigate the same entity but will do so from the perspective of different modal spheres.  Therefore, one criterion for the list of aspects is given by the diversity of scholarly disciplines. Where we have an established special science (physics, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics etc.) we can take seriously the possibility that here we meet an irreducible aspect of reality. 

A second criterion comes from the attempt of theorists to reduce reality to one or two aspects.  A reductionist project suggests the reality of the mode to which the others are to be reduced. The second diagram shows that many different reductionist projects have been attempted but the limited success of those projects is a second kind of evidence for the reality of the modes taken to be the basic denominator of reality.  Each form of reduction gets hold of a genuine aspect of reality but goes astray by trying to reduce all others aspects to it.  Such a strategy could not get off the ground if the basic reality was not genuine.




A third criterion arises out of the failures of each attempted reduction.  In trying to explain genuinely irreducible modes in terms of another mode, reality fights back leading to basic contradictions or paradoxes. We have already mentioned Zeno’s famous paradoxes concerning space and movement.
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Thursday, July 19, 2018

(15) Irreducible diversity


Any philosophical perspective on reality has to account for both the apparent unity and coherence of the world while acknowledging the variegated richness of our experience of the world.  Traditionally philosophers have done this in two ways, either through an appeal to a single basic reality that provides the unity to which all diversity must be related, or by proposing two basic realities whose distinctness explains diversity and combination explains unity.

We have already had reason to consider some of the views of the great French philosopher Rene Descartes, and once again he can provide us with an instructive illustration of the issue.  His dualism has provided the starting point for a number of problems that have occupied many philosophers since.  Descartes held that the world divides into two separate substances: mind and matter.  This left the material world free to the investigation of the mathematical sciences, which tended towards a deterministic result, and it left the mind free for the church’s teachings on matters moral and spiritual.  It also set up the classical problem of epistemology: how does the non-physical thinking mind know the non-thinking physical world? And in addition the classical problem of the philosophy of mind: how does the mind relate to the brain?

Those who have come after Descartes, despite offering strong criticisms of his views, have largely accepted his model. Sometimes rejecting mind and embracing materialism, sometimes rejecting matter and embracing idealism. This, admittedly simplified, background is useful for seeing the distinctive nature of a reformational approach to philosophy which can be summed up like this: rather than search for the unity and coherence of reality within reality itself, reformational philosophy starts with the assumption that the cosmos has a coherent order by virtue of God’s act of creation.  A lot more will need to be said about this assumption later.  However, for now, let’s have a look at the different result it gives us.

Reformational philosophy gives us an account of the coherence and diversity of reality through its theory of 15 or so basic modes of reality, these are the modal laws referred to by Seerveld in the quote above.   From the diagram we can see that such an approach allows for an understanding of the world that is considerably richer than any which continues to work from within the model left by Descartes.  By releasing us from the necessity of finding the ultimate meaning and origin of reality within reality itself, reformational philosophy sets us on a path with quite a different focus.  Reformational philosophy seeks to investigate and give a provisional account of the diverse ways that things function and people act in the world.






The rich diversity of reality can be viewed from two distinct perspectives.  First we will look at this diversity from the perspective of the different ways in which people and things function.  This is the horizontal direction in the diagram above and concerns what we call modal theory.  Secondly we can look at this diversity from the perspective of the things and institutions that function in these diverse ways, the vertical direction which we will call a theory of entities. These two elements cover the broad range of what exists, we can talk of things, artefacts, institutions, people, acts and events. Rather than listing these in future we will follow Chaplin and speak of existents to cover this range.

Once these are in place it will be possible to deal with the more complex issues of human society and how to think philosophically about our own existing and acting in the world.
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