New books from Zuidervaart

Two new books from Lambert Zuidervaart. 

Social Domains of Truth: Science, Politics, Art, and Religion

Shattering Silos: Reimagining Knowledge, Politics, and Social Critique

A philosophical maxim

Here is a philosophical maxim from James Conant:

"Do not read the character of the logically primitive phenomenon off the model of its logically alienated counterpart!" The Logical Alien p.368

I'm tempted to stop there. Let it sit, and just think more about what this means. It would take too much to trace out the role it plays in Conant's thought, in a book I am only starting to get into, and to unpack what interests me about it. But I'm going to push on a bit:

"a philosopher who suffers from logical alienation is one who mistakes a case that suffers from logical privation - a logically alienated case of consciousness, or of the exercise of a cognitive capacity, or form of human life - for the logically primitive form of the phenomenon under philosophical investigation." (368)

What is it to mistake a logical privation for something logically primitive? It seems to me that Conant's target, the kind of common philosophical mistake that he is trying to get a perspicuous view of, is the same that is under attack in Dooyeweerd's New Critique Vol. II, part 2 "The Epistemological Problem in the Light of the Cosmonomic Idea". It is the "dogmatic attitude in epistemology" that fails to see that "what has been theoretically isolated is never the 'datum'." (NC II, 433). The "logically primative form of the phenomenon" is what Dooyeweerd here calls the 'datum':

"The real 'datum' is the systatic coherence of meaning. In mature naive pre-theoretical experience reality is grasped in the full systasis of its modal functions. In this systasis the psychical and the logical functions prove to be bound up with all the other modal functions of human experience in an insoluble temporal meaning-coherence." (NC II, 433)

The logically alienated case comes into view as a result of a theoretical disjunction. It is a feature of the "dogmatic attitude in epistemology" that it:

"simply took for granted that which should be the chief problem of any critique of knowledge, viz. the abstraction of the sensory and logical functions of consciousness from the full systasis of meaning of the modal aspects of human experience." (NC II, 431)

If I am correct in thinking that Conant is making a fundamentally parallel point to Dooyeweerd then I think that in the 1026 pages of The Logical Alien there may just be the start of an answer to Rene van Woudenberg's question: "How exactly can naive experience and common sense function as touchstones in philosophy? How does this work in practice?" ("Two Touchstones for Philosophy: Naive Experience and Common Sense" in Philosophia Reformata 85:1 (2020), 38). To put it simply:

Do not read the character of the logically primitive phenomenon off the model of its logically alienated counterpart.

Or, remember that what has been theoretically isolated is never the 'datum'.

Hopefully I can come back to this and show the significance of these twin-maxims for a number of philosophical problems.

Distinctions, separations, dialectics and dualisms

One of the things that Herman Dooyeeerd is known for is his criticism of various dualisms. Many of those who have taken inspiration from Dooyeweerd have taken opposition to all manner of dualisms as a central task of thinking from a Biblical worldview. A good example is the book The Transforming Vision by Brain Walsh and Richard Middleton which has a chapter titled "The Problem of Dualism" followed up by another called "The Development of Dualism" (chapters 6 & 7). The zelousness with which this has sometimes been done has caused some annoyance. A good example is J.V Fesko who dedicates chapter 7 of his book Reforming Apologetics to responding to these criticisms as they relate to natural theology and assessments of Thomas Aquinas. On page 184 he criticises Dooyeweerd for failing to "recognize the difference between a true dichotomy (or separation) and a mere distinction". As with much else in the chapter this is a silly criticism (and one that undermines his central point about the importance of reading the primary sources. I document his failure to read Dooyeweerd's work here). Even Walsh and Middleton in their more popular presentation state clearly "there is a world of difference between dualism and duality" (95). Neverthelss, it is helpful, and interesting in its own right, to get a clearer view of how Dooyeweerd himself understood the difference between a distinction and a dichotomy or dualism.

A nice example of Dooyeweerd discussing this very point is in his response to Cornelius van Til in Jerusalem and Athens. 

The objectivism implied in traditional scholastic rationalism evokes as its alternative subjectivism, etc. It is consequently quite understandable that from your standpoint you consider my distinction between conceptual knowledge and central religious knowledge a result of an irrationalist mystical view of the latter. In line with Robbers and van Peursen you interpret this distinction as a separation, so that the central supra-conceptual sphere and the conceptual sphere of knowledge are conceived of as opposite to, and independent of, each other. In this way the distinction is naturally transformed into a dialectical tension, testifying to a dualistic trend in my thought. [emphasis in bold added]

Dooyeweerd claims that his distinction has been "transformed into a dialectical tension". How has this transformation ocurred? First there is an assumed position from which Dooyeweerd's view is interpreted. Dooyeweerd calls it "objectivism" or "rationalism". This view itself already posits an opposition, one between "objectivism" and "subjectivism". That is to say, that objectivism, on its own understanding, sets itself up against an opposed view, subjectivism. It is part of the self-understanding of objectivism (or rationalism) that it is on the right side of an opposition of views with subjectivism on the wrong side.

In the context of the discussion it would appear that "objectivism" is a position that understands knowledge in terms of "conceptual knowledge". The crucial assumption is that "conceptual knowledge" is taken to be a complete account of knowledge such that it is self-standingly intelligible on its own terms. This is the kind of position that Dooyeweerd elsewhere describes as the "pretended autonomy of thought". Such a description draws out the point that "conceptual knowledge" is understood to be free from dependence on any further element. It also highlights Dooyeweerd's typical strategy of challenging such self-dependence as an illusion.

Now objectivism, with its view that conceptual knowledge is complete and indepedent on its own terms, is committed to the view that whatever can be understood as distinct from "conceptual knowledge" must be separate and outside of its sphere. Whatever is not "conceptual knowledge" must therefore be of a totally different nature, it can only be "irrational" or "mystical". When Dooyeweerd claims that "central religious knowledge" is not the same as "conceptual knowledge" the guiding assumptions of objectivism must put such religious knowledge outside of "rational" conceptual knowledge and into its opposite: "irrational" mystical knowledge.

How is it that Dooyeweerd can resist this move? How can he claim that central religious knowledge is not something "opposite to, and independent of" conceptual knowledge while maintaining the importance of the distinction? Dooyeweerd's strategy is to reject the assumption that conceptual knowledge is something that we can make sense of as a self-standing and independent factor of our thinking and experience. His theory of the modal aspects makes this clear. Conceptual thinking is impossible without a multiplicity of distinguished elements brought together into a conceptual unity. This demonstrates the necessity of a basis in the numerical aspect of reality. There is further the logical extension of a concept pointing to the spatial aspect, the movement of thought, the relation of logical grounds to consequents, the life of thought resting on the functioning of the brain and logical representation based on our sensations. Any deepened sense of conceptual thought whereby the thinker can be said to have some rational control over the development and evaluation of their thinking and so can be held accountable involves the historical-formative aspect, the symbolic representation of thought points to the lingual aspect, the possibility to pursuade, to engage in dialogue, to evaluate requirements of the economy of thought, justification of reasons, while showing a proper concern for truth, each point beyond the merely logical-conceptual to all the other aspects of our experience. This integral coherence and multidimensional character of experience undermines the assumption that rational or conceptual knowledge can be taken as an independent sphere separated from the rest of our experience.

On Dooyeweerd's view the integral coherence that marks the multidimensional character of human experience finds it unity in the central religious root of the human heart. Now, sometimes, when people are first introduced to Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal spheres, and especially when the emphasis is laid on their irreducibility, there is a temptation to interpret his theory as involving a series of layers that sit on top of each other. It can then seem to be an important task to work out what sphere different things "belong" to in a way that makes the modal spheres appear to be separate and independent from each other. Such an interpretation can only end up transfoming Dooyeweerd's distinctions into a whole series of dialectical tensions! Exactly the kind of dialectical problems that his theory is designed to disolve are then interpreted back into his theory. It is essential then, for a correct understanding of Dooyeweerd, that we learn the lesson of the opening paragraph of the New Critique:

If I consider reality as it is given in the naive pre-theoretical experience, and then confront it with a theoretical analysis, through which reality appears to split up into various modal aspects then the first thing that strikes me, is the original indissoluble interrelation among these aspects which are for the first time explicitly distinguished in the theoretical attitude of mind. A indissoluble inner coherence binds the numerical to the spatial aspect, the latter to the aspect of mathematical movement, the aspect of movement to that of physical energy, which iself is the necessary basis of the aspect of organic life. The aspect of organic life has an inner connection with that of psychical feeling, the latter refers in its logical anticipation (the feeling of logical correctness or incorrectness) to the analytical-logical aspect. This in turn is connected with the historical, the linguistic, the aspect of social intercourse, the economic,the aesthetic,the jural,the moral aspects and that of faith. In this inter-modal cosmic coherence no single aspect stands by itself; everyone refers within and beyond itself to all the others. [emphasis in bold added]

We can now return to the first passage quoted above and give two reasons why his distinction between the central supra-conceptual sphere and the conceprtual sphere of knowledge avoids the pitfall of becoming a dialectical tension. The first is Dooyeweerd's account of the unity rooted in the human heart which undermines any sense in which rational thought could be considered as opposite to or cut off from central religious knowledge. Instead it is from out of the human heart that come the issues of life, which is to say that rational thought cannot be understood except in intimate connection with the central supra-conceptual sphere. Equally, Dooyeweerd claimed that the human heart, this central "I", is nothing in itself outside of its relation to God, other humans and the world, all of which are expressed through the diverse aspects including that of rational thought. The second is the way Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal spheres helps us see the incoherence of thinking of rational thought as something that could exist in itself, independent of the rest of human experience. In this way Dooyeweerd allows for a rich variety of distinctions to account for our living experience in the world without those distinctions becoming transformed into dialectical tensions.

Findings - A journal of reformational thought

The third issue of Findings has just come out and includes my review of Chris Watkin's Thinking Through Creation. The other contributions look well worth reading through. There is not an easy way to quickly view the contents of each issue, so I will provide links below to the first three issues.

Findings 1

Findings 2

Findings 3

Animals and Philosophy

I have a hunch that animals could be a really interesting and important challenge to any philosophical conception of reality. I mean a kind of "test case" for the validity of a philosophical position. How many philosophers have made room for animals in their philosophical reflections? Not many, or at least very few have given them serious consideration. When they have it has been in relation to questions of ethics. That is important. But what would a serious consideration of animals mean for areas like epistemology and ontology?

In his book on the message of the book of Job, A Battle for Righteousness, Klaas Popma devotes his final section to the animals and claims that it is here where we must find the solution to understanding the book. Here's a quote:

"Both wild and domesticated animals live their own lives in their domains which remain, for people, impenetrable. For those humans who consider themselves the most important of creatures, the instruction to look to the animal world for understanding God, is utterly humiliating. Animals who are, after all, our fellow creatures, by their own incomprehensibility, point to the incomprehensibility of God. Those who believe in the perspicuity of being only need to look at the animals to see how incredibly foolish that belief is. God has made all these animals and for no other reason than that it was His good pleasure to do so; for God always does what pleases Him. God created the animals because He took delight in doing so." (263)

His comment on the foolishness of the belief in the "perspicuity of being" is more than a hint of philosophical significance. Perhaps a worry we might have is that the very incomprehensibility of the animals is enough to set them aside in our attempts to throw light on the nature of reality from out of our philosophical thinking. Or, are we tempted by the thought that animals being part of the natural world - they don't have souls, or reason or whatever - any mystery regarding them is just a gap waiting for scientific elucidation. Hopefully any reformational philosophy would reject the second option. As for the first, even a reflection on the shape of such incomprehensibility, could prove beneficial in filling out our ontology and epistemology. Also, should we not say that incomprehensibility is not the full picture, there is also some knowledge as implied in Proverbs 12:10.

The second quote is from a long footnote in a paper originally given as a lecture and since turned into a book. This actually goes further and considers our response to plants and even human made artefacts. My claim is that if even plants can make some kind of demand on our (moral) consideration, then might it be worth considering what demand on our philosophical reflections the life of animals might make. The point at the end about how we should "treat every kind of thing in accordance with its nature" must also apply to philosophy as well as to more 'practical' pursuits.

Christine Korsgaard "Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals"

“Why shouldn’t the argument of this essay extend even further down the line of the different senses of “natural good” or “good for”? Our moral values spring from reflective endorsement of the natural good we are inclined to pursue as animals, but that natural good in turn depends on the sort of good to which plants are oriented, and that in turn to the general, functional capacity for having a good. Why shouldn’t we think that implicit in our endorsement of our own self-concern is a concern for the good of anything that has a good? At the risk of being thought a complete lunatic, let me admit that I am tempted by this thought. There is no reason to believe that “moral standing” is an on-off notion: perhaps it comes in degrees or kinds. We respond normatively to plants; a drooping plant in need of a drink seems to present us with a reason to water it; a sapling growing from what seems to be almost sheer rock makes us want to cheer it on. Is this because we cannot help animistically imagining that plant experiences its good? Is it because, as I say in the text, the line between plants and animals is unclear? Or is it perhaps because the shared condition of life itself elicits these responses? Or could it even be that we have duties, not only to our fellow creatures, but to our fellow entities? Granted, it sounds absurd to suggest that we might have duties to machines, yet still there is something in the far outer reaches of our normative thought and feeling that corresponds even to this. A general discomfort in the face of wanton destructiveness, a tendency to wince when objects are broken, an objection to the neglect or abuse of precision tools that isn’t rooted completely in the idea of economic waste… Again it might be suggested that such feelings result from a kind of animistic imagination, that we imagine that the tool feels the badness of being broken. But what is it that calls forth that animistic imagination, unless it is a distant form of respect for functional identity itself, a condition we share with all entities? I do not mention these possible consequences of my of argument in order to insist on them, but only to affirm that if someone thinks this follows I wouldn’t regard that as a reduction to absurdity. Perhaps we should treat every kind of thing in accordance with its nature, in accordance with the kinds of good and bads to which it is subject.” (p.33)

Dooyeweerd's warning against fascism and communism

A.R.J.A.

It is with ardent conviction that I acceded to the request of the board of A.R.J.A. to draw attention to the work of the Young Antirevolutionary Study Clubs.

There still is far too little awareness among us that our whole movement is caught up in the crucible of our great and anxious times which will reduce to ashes everything that does not survive that fiery trial.

There is also too little awareness among us that a task greater than ever before is waiting for us in the service of our King Christ Jesus to propagate our principles with deepened knowledge and true inspiration in a world where the spirit of darkness is at work.

It is alarming to see how in our own circles many young people and even older folk are swept along by fascist and communist currents, how many are spiritually uprooted and become an easy prey to the radical and demonic powers which since the world war have been threatening Europe with spiritual dissolution.

In the name of our God we must adjure our young people: 

Arm yourself with the full armour of faith and prayer, and deepen your knowledge for the political struggle that awaits you!

Do not think – for God’s sake, do not think for a moment – that we can just continue to live off the strengths that we have amassed in the past. Let the terror of the Lord enter our souls as we face the mighty signs of the times!

Young people! Remember your calling before it is too late.

Your place is with the young guard of study clubs who have realized that a spiritual standstill will mean our spiritual demise.

In our day, when such tremendously complicated questions are disturbing mankind, the intellectual equipment of those who went before you no longer suffices.

The propaganda of unbelief, the spirit of revolution – they are today armed with weapons that are extremely dangerous to all who do not know their effect and are not familiar with their toxic subtleties.

Against these only prayer avails, and a faith which glows with zeal for the cause of the Lord, but which will then irresistibly drive you on to whet the weapons with which you will soon wage the warfare of your principles.

H. Dooyeweerd  

column in De Standaard  

Tues, 29 Nov. 1932  

[4 months before Hitler’s coup] 

Translated by Harry van Dyke 

The Laymen's Lounge

Jason Estopinal is posting some great stuff over at his website The Laymen's Lounge.

As part of a series on "You should know about ..." the most recent is an excellent introduction to Herman Dooyeweerd by Steve Bishop and Gregory Baus.

Steve Bishop has also contributed another on Dirk Vollenhoven and one on Neo-Calvinism.

I have even got in on the act with a piece on sphere sovereignty.

So dig in and enjoy.