IN MEMORIAM J. P. A. MEKKES by J van der Hoeven (1987)

Now Johan Mekkes has also left us. At the age of 89, the good fight came to an end for him. Earlier, in his gaze, the recognition of friends and students increasingly made way for a prospect of meeting our Forerunner. In this way, we too were gradually and at a distance prepared for his passing. Yet the farewell is still too close, the incision of it still too sharp, to make more than a few words of remembrance possible. Appropriate reflection on the depth and scope of Mekkes' thinking requires a longer period of time than the editors were granted for this issue - although the reader will already encounter references to Mekkes with remarkable frequency in this issue. How shall we characterize his thinking and writing? If it must be in one word, I choose: penetration. First of all, this says something about his personal way of philosophizing. Any lack of commitment was alien to it. Deeply aware of the provisionality and fallibility of human thought, including his own, he nevertheless practiced philosophy with genuine commitment. Readers of Philosophia Reformata know that this commitment was marked by mission. Precisely for that reason, with the passion of the personal, it was at the same time aimed at real encounter with others: students, but also non-kindred spirits and opponents. That trait of penetratingness has not failed to be both infectious and stimulating. Could it be otherwise? With Karl Jaspers he criticized 'passive tolerance', and even more than this he shunned publishing for a vague audience. He was drawn into thinking by the human, the striving and choosing, the struggling and suffering, the rebellious and sought-after.

But he respected the demands and possibilities of thought. The step-by-step, the complicated and the multifaceted were taken into account. The structure and articulation of an argument, of a conversation with a predecessor or contemporary, were his great concern. Living in wonder and reverence, he was also sensitive to nuance. However, the frame of an argument often tensed and bent under the persistent concentration on the heart of the matter and the heart of the human being. Accessibility and lucidity are therefore not the most striking features of his way of thinking and writing. But those who took the trouble were lastingly struck by a penetration which, in addition to those already mentioned, was given by the nature of the matter which occupied him. That matter was the all-pervading meaning-dynamics of reality as creation, propelled towards its destination. And although in sharpness of drawing distinctions he was no one's inferior, yet the striking feature of his philosophical work consists above all in the combination of that acumen with an intense awareness of the dynamics of meaning. That is why he was also wary of schematic analyses - tempting especially when a philosophy of impressive architecture is 'available'. All too easily an ingenuity arises that seems pale and bloodless. Mekkes himself was interested in systematic distinctions insofar as it resembled the search for the power grid of an electric power station. (I borrow this image from one of his older articles).

In addition, there were the special accents and the unique style of presentation, also when compared with the circle of reformational philosophers. Meaning dynamics, creation, concentration, - these are big, imposing words; but they only gain real expressiveness in the personal connection with the Master and His way. 'Law-idea' is also a word worth keeping, but only if it remains related to the law of the grain of wheat. When the 'Biblical ground-motive' speaks of 'redemption' this word will not be able to do without the continuous tones of humility, trial, exercise for its pure sound to resonate; these are also indispensable for a Biblical philosophy of history.

Mekkes' own style of presentation: we knew him as combative, uncompromising. But deeply moved by the word of the dying grain of wheat, he managed to keep these features free from triumphalism and warlike fervour. He was also blessed with a nobility that is rare, 'left' as well as 'right'. He felt formed - as he once told me - above all by three teachers of great stature: General Jhr. W. Roell ('a deeply religious nobleman of the old stamp', - G. Puchinger), H. Dooyeweerd and the Walloon minister - at some distance from Dutch Reformed Protestantism - G. Forget.

Mekkes has made a particularly valuable contribution to this journal. He held the always demanding position of editorial secretary from 1945 to early 1959. Especially in that period he wrote many concise and finely crafted reviews. But then and later he wrote several great articles of a high standard which greatly promoted study and reflection - I will only mention “Wilhelm Dilthey's 'Kritik der historischen Vernunft' in de wending der eeuw,”, 20 (1955), p. 7-45, and “Wet en subject in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (Onze wijsbegeerte op een driesprong)”[Law and Subject in the Philosophy of the Law Idea (Our Philosophy at a Crossroads)], 27 (1962), p. 126-190.

Pending a more detailed and thorough consideration of his work - as anticipated above - I think it appropriate to close now by leaving the last word to Mekkes himself. I quote a few passages from a little-known publication that appeared in 1959 in the Leiden University Press under the title “The scientific-critical attitude and the acceptance of revelation” [De wetenschappelijk-critische houding en het aanvaarden van de openbaring], which contained both a lecture by Mekkes and one by his then Leiden colleague J. H. M. M. Loenen, both delivered at a meeting of the Christian Student Council.

'Divine Revelation only exercises its critique in this regard in order to keep science a science. It wants to prevent science from degenerating into the cult of the idol of thought, scientific, historical, theological thinking. It does not lay claim to any scientific results, not even partially. It does not provide scientific data. It points the way, or perhaps better yet: it warns against false directions. It warns against taking paths that inevitably lead to a dead end - that is, in truth, a religious - contradiction (...). It does not accept for science any residual theoretical truths and stresses the permanently hypothetical and subjective character of all scientific practice and of all methods, including Christian ones  (...) It does not fail to point out the solidarity involved in the task of the entire human community to bring science into culture in open communication, but within this communication the thesis of 'open reasonableness' as a separate thesis will have to demonstrate its merits, instead of directing the tournament from the outset (...) The critique of Revelation thus points to the horizon, which - far beyond the scientific horizon - is the true human horizon ( ... )'

'Where is the decision finally made about the entire practice of my life, about my scientific insight integrally and totally? Where lies the crisis of my daily, my scientific, my philosophical, my ... theological actions?

That crisis, the court of criticism, lies in the most displaced place in the entire history of humankind, and it is from that place alone that I can see the furthest horizon, which also encloses my widest horizon of thought.

I can only come to that place as a child. For it is the cross from which the Most Despised of the despised has been cast out. And where the Risen One says to me: everything is yours and you ... are Mine!' (p. 10, 11, 12, 13).

J. van der Hoeven

Mekkes on "Present Thinking"

Life such as it is now, for us twentieth-century people, has not fallen out of the sky. Neither has science: it has its history. Everyone knows and understands this, except Western science itself, especially since the previous century. It believes in the always 'present thinking', which, like a camera on a tripod, takes snapshots of the 'factuality' in front of the lens - snapshots that, as in a film, give the illusion of movement, of events, of history. However, the camera itself stands fixed, positioned outside that movement. From that point the story begins and ends, and the person behind the camera remains completely out of the picture. This “present thinking” can itself at most focus somewhat more sharply, reflecting and correcting itself, but it remains holding the first and last word for itself.

How has science become so uncritical and pretentious in our Western mind, especially in this West that was once Christianized, and thus could have known that history is the history of life, and not a result of thought? 

...

Various thinkers had already warned against this in the nineteenth century: people such as Kierkegaard (who emphasised the subjective existence of the thinker) and Marx (philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change the world); in the Netherlands, and especially for our Christian circles, Abraham Kuyper. But that this raised questions concerning the privileged position of thought, and pointed to another core, remained misunderstood or was ignored: people fitted Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Kuyper into their own frame of thought.

But it was precisely reformational philosophy that made it clear that Kuyper had indicated a different central point of reflection than thinking.

With this, reformational philosophy had provisionally found a basis from which to proceed to the attack. If there is a central point that transcends thinking – central because it is the centre of everything in life – then a break with 'thinking' as a fixed point must be made. 

...

It is not enough to make critical comments on the content of humanistic assertions, now included in a broader framework as 'general-natural'. The content could not be the primary target; it is a question of the point out of which people operate, namely the exclusive universal validity of thinking, regardless of how critically praised. The 'Self-criticism' of thinking, as provided by Immanuel Kant, is also not enough, according to reformational philosophy: self-criticism must be pushed so far that I, thinking, see that thinking is not an independent activity, and therefore know that I have to account for what precedes science. In other words; self-criticism must penetrate to the question: where do the outflows of life come from, including thinking, which is after all an activity of life? 

Johan Mekkes “God’s Normaal en de wijsbegeerte.” (1974) pp.35-37 

The dynamic character of reality

Sometimes Dooyeweerd has been accused of articulating a static view of creational structures. Whatever the truth of this I think it does go against his intention as expressed by his statement that “all structures of temporal reality are structures of cosmic time” (NC I 105).

Here is another indication of Dooyeweerd’s desire to stress the dynamic character of temporal reality:

“the entire conception to the effect that temporal reality should be something statically given, a fixed “Vorhandenes”, rests upon a fundamental failure to appreciate the dynamic character of reality in the whole coherence of its different modal aspects. In our view, this dynamic character is guaranteed by the mode of ex-sistence of all created things as meaning, finding no rest in itself, and by the opening-process of temporal reality” (NC I 112)

This theme of creational dynamics is something that Mekkes took up in his philosophical reflection, he wrote that

"right from the beginning reformational philosophy emphasized the dynamic character of creation as being God's first revelation to the creature. That's why it spoke of the ground-motive of creation."

In another place he speaks of the

"thesis of disclosure, a dynamic principle" which is "not secondary with regard to the modalities, as if the latter could be subsequently related to each other in a dynamic relation. It is the dynamics of creaturely meaning which shows itself in those modal aspects. It is the dynamics which is primary."

Mekkes placed at the centre of his philosophical work the themes of creational dynamics, religion as radix and a critique of Reason. These are themes are certainly present in Dooyeweerd, yet it appears that Mekkes came to develop them in distinctive ways. Since Mekkes work is a very difficult and as yet largely untranslated we will have to wait for more work to be done to assess his contribution to reformational philosophy. The glimpses I have seen and the evidence of those he influenced (eg Bob Goudzwaard) suggest to me that he is well worth a serious study.

Philosophy and Universality

I recently read an article on abstraction by Peter Osborne called “The Reproach of Abstraction” (thanks to Tony for lending me this issue of Radical Philosophy). At the start of the essay he situates it within the task of rescuing “the idea of philosophy as a discourse of universal mediation from the corrosive critiques of its claims to an absolute universality, familiar in recent years in various pragmatist, historicist, contextualist and deconstructivist forms.” He then provides this quote from Paul Ricoeur:

Philosophical discourse achieves universality only by passing through the contingence of cultures … its rigour is dependent upon equivocal languages … its coherence must traverse the war between hermeneutics. (Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation p.47)

I really should make more of an effort to read some more of Ricoeur’s work.

Anyway my interest in the issue of universality was tweaked again on reading James Smith’s Jacque Derrida Live Theory. Rather than say anything more about this at the moment I’ll add two more suggestive quotes on this theme.

First off Alain Badiou in the first essay of his book Infinite Thought outlines “the present state of philosophy” in terms of three principles tendencies or orientations: a hermeneutic orientation, an analytical orientation and a postmodern orientation. Each of which in their own way (though all because of a linguistic turn) have been obstacles to the desire of philosophy for truth and universality. In other words he too bemoans the corrosive critiques that Osborne alludes to, and this is why:

“If the category of truth is ignored, if we never confront anything but the polyvalence of meaning, then philosophy will never assume the challenge that is put out to it by a world subordinated to the merchandising of money and information.” (p.36)

And finally J.P.A. Mekkes at the end of his article “Methodology and Practice” talks of an integral norm rather than universality, and distinguishes between positing a norm and finding the way towards that norm:

An integral norm of life obtains for the direction of scientific thought, a norm reaching beyond every dialectic of practical and theoretical reason no matter how modernized, or camouflaged, and that norm subjects our ‘Bildung’ to it. It is here that reformational philosophy, persisting in dia­logue along immanent philosophical lines, wants to help find the way towards that norm, and wants to consider the consequences too, with every­one else. Reformational philosophy cannot, in typically western philoso­phical fashion, accepting the traditional philosophical and special-scientific pretensions to originality, posit a norm because this philosophy along with everyone and everything remains subject to the norm that has been set, for as long as it is allowed us to speak of LIFE.” (Philosophia Reformata 1973 Vol. 38 p.96)