The
structure of a thing is not universal in the same way as the modal aspects,
they are typical. While this helps give
a theoretical account of concrete things it does not get us to the uniqueness
of things, this is beyond the grasp of theory.
What we understand naively as a whole in our experience becomes in
analysis something far more complex.
Rarely do we meet with entities that can be analysed as a simple whole,
instead they are built up in a typical interlacing of simple structures of
atoms, molecules and cells for example (ESL, I 209). We have seen that this requires us to look at
complex wholes where simple structures are encapsulated in larger structural
totalities. Now we wish to emphasis
again the character and limits of theoretical thinking. The attempt to give a theoretical account of
entities confronts us with the apparently insoluable problem of how we can
arrive at the whole entity through analysis given that analysis necessarily breaks
up what in reality is an indivisible whole.
Indeed the unity of an entity is something that transcends the boundaries
of the modal aspects which provide the necessary entry-points of theoretical
analysis. This means that theoretical
access to the individual whole is impossible, instead an analysis of the
typical-structure of a thing must presuppose its unity. We have already seen that the typical-structure
or idionomy of an entity is expressed within the modal aspects which are
accessible to theoretical analysis and so a theoretical account of idionomies
is possible. However if we forget the
limits of theory and seek to discover the true nature of things through theory
alone we will end with deep theoretical problems. This is well exemplified in the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant. Since he took theoretical
analysis to be primary without any critical investigation into its character
and limits he took the abstract view of perception (that is the psychical modal
aspect understood by empiricism) as what we experience. Once the aspects have been taken as the
primary given in our experience, entities in their totality and unity fall away
behind the abstracted aspects as mysterious “Ding ansich” (the
“thing-in-itself”). So an over-theorised
view of our practical experience turns the concrete unity, identity and
totality of things into a necessary but unprovable hypothesis.
The importance of this point, that
you cannot reconstruct theoretically the unique character of concrete reality, can be shown in relation to the philosophy of mind. This field is now dominated by anti-dualistic
viewpoints and when speaking of a person the move is often made, without comment
or reflection, from the personal ‘I’ to a mind.
This though crosses a boundary as you cannot identify the subjective ‘I’
with mental phenomenon (a functional approach).
Attempts to explain philosophically the nature of personal identity goes
beyond the capability of theoretical thought.
When our everyday knowledge and experience of reality is replaced with
concepts you lose the concrete. This
concreteness is a feature of reality and not merely a subjective colouring that
we give to reality, and as such it cannot be replaced by scientific theories, which of necessity presuppose and abstract from this reality.
A
second point of importance is that the analysis of reformational philosophy begins
with the recognition of the diversity of things and so can account for the
distinctive features of different entities in the world. A functional approach easily misses the
richness found in ordinary experience.
An example of this can be found in discussions in the philosophy of mind
about artificial intelligence. From a
purely functional viewpoint it can be difficult to explain the difference
between a human mind and a computer. A
reformational theory of entities shows up the vast difference between the
two. We begin to see clearly the role of
human design and use of computers so that the objective-functioning of the
computer can make sense only against the subjective functioning of human persons.
This can explain the importance of language as an object function of the
computer.
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