A. Janse on Anthropology

Chis Gousmett has translated a number of significant works of Janse on the theme of anthropology. Janse' work was very significant in the developed of reformational philosophy. He had a particularly strong influence and interaction with Vollenhoven on a biblical understanding on being human which helped move him away from scholastic notions of the soul and towards a much more biblical emphasis of the unity and fullness of human life lived before the face of God.

These works are now avaliable on the All of Life Redeemed website.

Here is the preface to Man as a "Living Soul":

The most current popular meaning of the word “experiential” is this, that the Christian experiences something in the “soul,” which was seen as a separate pious part of a human being. 

“Soul” is then a more pious word than foot and hand. 

The Biblical meaning of “experience” is this, that a child of God in the whole of his life as a whole person, as a whole “living soul” from the crown of his head to the soles of his feet and in all things of life, experiences the blessings or the threats of the God of the Covenant. So, there is no morsel of the terrain of life in or round him that would stand outside the Covenant with God. 

So as to be able to understand this point of the Holy Scriptures the Lord must also open our eyes for the language of the Holy Scriptures, where they speak of the “soul.” 

Up until now the Greek philosophers have supplied us with the foundational concepts for Christian anthropology. 

This book is an attempt to restore the terms of the Holy Scriptures to a place of honour, so that every Bible reader knows what the Scripture says about human beings as living souls and so that the popular misconceptions concerning a number of texts were debated. 

I give therefore first a more historically oriented chapter about the concept “soul,” and after that a more systematic overview of “the living soul.” 

The Author 

Biggekerke, 

February 1934.

New Introduction to Dooyeweerd's Philosophy

Many introductions to Dooyeweerd's thought have been published over the years. However, very few are both accessible to a new audience and authoritative guides to his philosophy. This new book fulfils both requirements and even includes some beautiful diagrams to illustrate Dooyeweerd's ideas. It is availble as an expensive hardback and also as open access here.

IN MEMORIAM J. P. A. MEKKES by J van der Hoeven (1987)

Now Johan Mekkes has also left us. At the age of 89, the good fight came to an end for him. Earlier, in his gaze, the recognition of friends and students increasingly made way for a prospect of meeting our Forerunner. In this way, we too were gradually and at a distance prepared for his passing. Yet the farewell is still too close, the incision of it still too sharp, to make more than a few words of remembrance possible. Appropriate reflection on the depth and scope of Mekkes' thinking requires a longer period of time than the editors were granted for this issue - although the reader will already encounter references to Mekkes with remarkable frequency in this issue. How shall we characterize his thinking and writing? If it must be in one word, I choose: penetration. First of all, this says something about his personal way of philosophizing. Any lack of commitment was alien to it. Deeply aware of the provisionality and fallibility of human thought, including his own, he nevertheless practiced philosophy with genuine commitment. Readers of Philosophia Reformata know that this commitment was marked by mission. Precisely for that reason, with the passion of the personal, it was at the same time aimed at real encounter with others: students, but also non-kindred spirits and opponents. That trait of penetratingness has not failed to be both infectious and stimulating. Could it be otherwise? With Karl Jaspers he criticized 'passive tolerance', and even more than this he shunned publishing for a vague audience. He was drawn into thinking by the human, the striving and choosing, the struggling and suffering, the rebellious and sought-after.

But he respected the demands and possibilities of thought. The step-by-step, the complicated and the multifaceted were taken into account. The structure and articulation of an argument, of a conversation with a predecessor or contemporary, were his great concern. Living in wonder and reverence, he was also sensitive to nuance. However, the frame of an argument often tensed and bent under the persistent concentration on the heart of the matter and the heart of the human being. Accessibility and lucidity are therefore not the most striking features of his way of thinking and writing. But those who took the trouble were lastingly struck by a penetration which, in addition to those already mentioned, was given by the nature of the matter which occupied him. That matter was the all-pervading meaning-dynamics of reality as creation, propelled towards its destination. And although in sharpness of drawing distinctions he was no one's inferior, yet the striking feature of his philosophical work consists above all in the combination of that acumen with an intense awareness of the dynamics of meaning. That is why he was also wary of schematic analyses - tempting especially when a philosophy of impressive architecture is 'available'. All too easily an ingenuity arises that seems pale and bloodless. Mekkes himself was interested in systematic distinctions insofar as it resembled the search for the power grid of an electric power station. (I borrow this image from one of his older articles).

In addition, there were the special accents and the unique style of presentation, also when compared with the circle of reformational philosophers. Meaning dynamics, creation, concentration, - these are big, imposing words; but they only gain real expressiveness in the personal connection with the Master and His way. 'Law-idea' is also a word worth keeping, but only if it remains related to the law of the grain of wheat. When the 'Biblical ground-motive' speaks of 'redemption' this word will not be able to do without the continuous tones of humility, trial, exercise for its pure sound to resonate; these are also indispensable for a Biblical philosophy of history.

Mekkes' own style of presentation: we knew him as combative, uncompromising. But deeply moved by the word of the dying grain of wheat, he managed to keep these features free from triumphalism and warlike fervour. He was also blessed with a nobility that is rare, 'left' as well as 'right'. He felt formed - as he once told me - above all by three teachers of great stature: General Jhr. W. Roell ('a deeply religious nobleman of the old stamp', - G. Puchinger), H. Dooyeweerd and the Walloon minister - at some distance from Dutch Reformed Protestantism - G. Forget.

Mekkes has made a particularly valuable contribution to this journal. He held the always demanding position of editorial secretary from 1945 to early 1959. Especially in that period he wrote many concise and finely crafted reviews. But then and later he wrote several great articles of a high standard which greatly promoted study and reflection - I will only mention “Wilhelm Dilthey's 'Kritik der historischen Vernunft' in de wending der eeuw,”, 20 (1955), p. 7-45, and “Wet en subject in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (Onze wijsbegeerte op een driesprong)”[Law and Subject in the Philosophy of the Law Idea (Our Philosophy at a Crossroads)], 27 (1962), p. 126-190.

Pending a more detailed and thorough consideration of his work - as anticipated above - I think it appropriate to close now by leaving the last word to Mekkes himself. I quote a few passages from a little-known publication that appeared in 1959 in the Leiden University Press under the title “The scientific-critical attitude and the acceptance of revelation” [De wetenschappelijk-critische houding en het aanvaarden van de openbaring], which contained both a lecture by Mekkes and one by his then Leiden colleague J. H. M. M. Loenen, both delivered at a meeting of the Christian Student Council.

'Divine Revelation only exercises its critique in this regard in order to keep science a science. It wants to prevent science from degenerating into the cult of the idol of thought, scientific, historical, theological thinking. It does not lay claim to any scientific results, not even partially. It does not provide scientific data. It points the way, or perhaps better yet: it warns against false directions. It warns against taking paths that inevitably lead to a dead end - that is, in truth, a religious - contradiction (...). It does not accept for science any residual theoretical truths and stresses the permanently hypothetical and subjective character of all scientific practice and of all methods, including Christian ones  (...) It does not fail to point out the solidarity involved in the task of the entire human community to bring science into culture in open communication, but within this communication the thesis of 'open reasonableness' as a separate thesis will have to demonstrate its merits, instead of directing the tournament from the outset (...) The critique of Revelation thus points to the horizon, which - far beyond the scientific horizon - is the true human horizon ( ... )'

'Where is the decision finally made about the entire practice of my life, about my scientific insight integrally and totally? Where lies the crisis of my daily, my scientific, my philosophical, my ... theological actions?

That crisis, the court of criticism, lies in the most displaced place in the entire history of humankind, and it is from that place alone that I can see the furthest horizon, which also encloses my widest horizon of thought.

I can only come to that place as a child. For it is the cross from which the Most Despised of the despised has been cast out. And where the Risen One says to me: everything is yours and you ... are Mine!' (p. 10, 11, 12, 13).

J. van der Hoeven

Dooyeweerd and the history of modern philosophy

Dooyeweerd is often misunderstood to reject all prior philosophy. His claim that philosophy has deep religious roots is taken to imply that a Christian is thereby duty bound to reject all philosophy that is not explicitly founded on the Christian religion. However, he rejects this view thoroughly and repeatedly. Here is one such example.

“Philosophic thought as such stands in an inner relationship with historical development, postulated by our very philosophical basic Idea, and no thinker whatever can withdraw himself from this historical evolution. Our transcendental ground-idea itself requires the recognition of the “philosophia perennis" in this sense and rejects the proud illusion that any thinker whatever, could begin as it were with a clean slate and disassociate himself from the development of an age-old process of philosophical reflection.

…

Whoever takes the pains to penetrate into the philosophic system developed in this work, will soon discover, how it is wedded to the historical development of philosophic and scientific thought with a thousand ties, so far as its immanent philosophic content is concerned, even though we can nowhere follow the immanence-philosophy.” (NC I, 118)

I’ve made a provisional translation of Johan van der Hoeven’s assessment of Dooyeweerd’s engagement with modern philosophy. See here.

Article in Philosophia Reformata

My article "Herman Dooyeweerd and Marburg Neo-Kantianism" will be in the next issue of Philosophia Reformata. It is available in the "advanced articles" now.

It is a review of Israel Costa's excellent Masters thesis “Herman Dooyeweerd e a construção dos problemas da crítica transcendental do pensamento teórico”.

Mekkes on "Present Thinking"

Life such as it is now, for us twentieth-century people, has not fallen out of the sky. Neither has science: it has its history. Everyone knows and understands this, except Western science itself, especially since the previous century. It believes in the always 'present thinking', which, like a camera on a tripod, takes snapshots of the 'factuality' in front of the lens - snapshots that, as in a film, give the illusion of movement, of events, of history. However, the camera itself stands fixed, positioned outside that movement. From that point the story begins and ends, and the person behind the camera remains completely out of the picture. This “present thinking” can itself at most focus somewhat more sharply, reflecting and correcting itself, but it remains holding the first and last word for itself.

How has science become so uncritical and pretentious in our Western mind, especially in this West that was once Christianized, and thus could have known that history is the history of life, and not a result of thought? 

...

Various thinkers had already warned against this in the nineteenth century: people such as Kierkegaard (who emphasised the subjective existence of the thinker) and Marx (philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change the world); in the Netherlands, and especially for our Christian circles, Abraham Kuyper. But that this raised questions concerning the privileged position of thought, and pointed to another core, remained misunderstood or was ignored: people fitted Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Kuyper into their own frame of thought.

But it was precisely reformational philosophy that made it clear that Kuyper had indicated a different central point of reflection than thinking.

With this, reformational philosophy had provisionally found a basis from which to proceed to the attack. If there is a central point that transcends thinking – central because it is the centre of everything in life – then a break with 'thinking' as a fixed point must be made. 

...

It is not enough to make critical comments on the content of humanistic assertions, now included in a broader framework as 'general-natural'. The content could not be the primary target; it is a question of the point out of which people operate, namely the exclusive universal validity of thinking, regardless of how critically praised. The 'Self-criticism' of thinking, as provided by Immanuel Kant, is also not enough, according to reformational philosophy: self-criticism must be pushed so far that I, thinking, see that thinking is not an independent activity, and therefore know that I have to account for what precedes science. In other words; self-criticism must penetrate to the question: where do the outflows of life come from, including thinking, which is after all an activity of life? 

Johan Mekkes “God’s Normaal en de wijsbegeerte.” (1974) pp.35-37 

New books from Zuidervaart

Two new books from Lambert Zuidervaart. 

Social Domains of Truth: Science, Politics, Art, and Religion

Shattering Silos: Reimagining Knowledge, Politics, and Social Critique

A philosophical maxim

Here is a philosophical maxim from James Conant:

"Do not read the character of the logically primitive phenomenon off the model of its logically alienated counterpart!" The Logical Alien p.368

I'm tempted to stop there. Let it sit, and just think more about what this means. It would take too much to trace out the role it plays in Conant's thought, in a book I am only starting to get into, and to unpack what interests me about it. But I'm going to push on a bit:

"a philosopher who suffers from logical alienation is one who mistakes a case that suffers from logical privation - a logically alienated case of consciousness, or of the exercise of a cognitive capacity, or form of human life - for the logically primitive form of the phenomenon under philosophical investigation." (368)

What is it to mistake a logical privation for something logically primitive? It seems to me that Conant's target, the kind of common philosophical mistake that he is trying to get a perspicuous view of, is the same that is under attack in Dooyeweerd's New Critique Vol. II, part 2 "The Epistemological Problem in the Light of the Cosmonomic Idea". It is the "dogmatic attitude in epistemology" that fails to see that "what has been theoretically isolated is never the 'datum'." (NC II, 433). The "logically primative form of the phenomenon" is what Dooyeweerd here calls the 'datum':

"The real 'datum' is the systatic coherence of meaning. In mature naive pre-theoretical experience reality is grasped in the full systasis of its modal functions. In this systasis the psychical and the logical functions prove to be bound up with all the other modal functions of human experience in an insoluble temporal meaning-coherence." (NC II, 433)

The logically alienated case comes into view as a result of a theoretical disjunction. It is a feature of the "dogmatic attitude in epistemology" that it:

"simply took for granted that which should be the chief problem of any critique of knowledge, viz. the abstraction of the sensory and logical functions of consciousness from the full systasis of meaning of the modal aspects of human experience." (NC II, 431)

If I am correct in thinking that Conant is making a fundamentally parallel point to Dooyeweerd then I think that in the 1026 pages of The Logical Alien there may just be the start of an answer to Rene van Woudenberg's question: "How exactly can naive experience and common sense function as touchstones in philosophy? How does this work in practice?" ("Two Touchstones for Philosophy: Naive Experience and Common Sense" in Philosophia Reformata 85:1 (2020), 38). To put it simply:

Do not read the character of the logically primitive phenomenon off the model of its logically alienated counterpart.

Or, remember that what has been theoretically isolated is never the 'datum'.

Hopefully I can come back to this and show the significance of these twin-maxims for a number of philosophical problems.

Distinctions, separations, dialectics and dualisms

One of the things that Herman Dooyeeerd is known for is his criticism of various dualisms. Many of those who have taken inspiration from Dooyeweerd have taken opposition to all manner of dualisms as a central task of thinking from a Biblical worldview. A good example is the book The Transforming Vision by Brain Walsh and Richard Middleton which has a chapter titled "The Problem of Dualism" followed up by another called "The Development of Dualism" (chapters 6 & 7). The zelousness with which this has sometimes been done has caused some annoyance. A good example is J.V Fesko who dedicates chapter 7 of his book Reforming Apologetics to responding to these criticisms as they relate to natural theology and assessments of Thomas Aquinas. On page 184 he criticises Dooyeweerd for failing to "recognize the difference between a true dichotomy (or separation) and a mere distinction". As with much else in the chapter this is a silly criticism (and one that undermines his central point about the importance of reading the primary sources. I document his failure to read Dooyeweerd's work here). Even Walsh and Middleton in their more popular presentation state clearly "there is a world of difference between dualism and duality" (95). Neverthelss, it is helpful, and interesting in its own right, to get a clearer view of how Dooyeweerd himself understood the difference between a distinction and a dichotomy or dualism.

A nice example of Dooyeweerd discussing this very point is in his response to Cornelius van Til in Jerusalem and Athens. 

The objectivism implied in traditional scholastic rationalism evokes as its alternative subjectivism, etc. It is consequently quite understandable that from your standpoint you consider my distinction between conceptual knowledge and central religious knowledge a result of an irrationalist mystical view of the latter. In line with Robbers and van Peursen you interpret this distinction as a separation, so that the central supra-conceptual sphere and the conceptual sphere of knowledge are conceived of as opposite to, and independent of, each other. In this way the distinction is naturally transformed into a dialectical tension, testifying to a dualistic trend in my thought. [emphasis in bold added]

Dooyeweerd claims that his distinction has been "transformed into a dialectical tension". How has this transformation ocurred? First there is an assumed position from which Dooyeweerd's view is interpreted. Dooyeweerd calls it "objectivism" or "rationalism". This view itself already posits an opposition, one between "objectivism" and "subjectivism". That is to say, that objectivism, on its own understanding, sets itself up against an opposed view, subjectivism. It is part of the self-understanding of objectivism (or rationalism) that it is on the right side of an opposition of views with subjectivism on the wrong side.

In the context of the discussion it would appear that "objectivism" is a position that understands knowledge in terms of "conceptual knowledge". The crucial assumption is that "conceptual knowledge" is taken to be a complete account of knowledge such that it is self-standingly intelligible on its own terms. This is the kind of position that Dooyeweerd elsewhere describes as the "pretended autonomy of thought". Such a description draws out the point that "conceptual knowledge" is understood to be free from dependence on any further element. It also highlights Dooyeweerd's typical strategy of challenging such self-dependence as an illusion.

Now objectivism, with its view that conceptual knowledge is complete and indepedent on its own terms, is committed to the view that whatever can be understood as distinct from "conceptual knowledge" must be separate and outside of its sphere. Whatever is not "conceptual knowledge" must therefore be of a totally different nature, it can only be "irrational" or "mystical". When Dooyeweerd claims that "central religious knowledge" is not the same as "conceptual knowledge" the guiding assumptions of objectivism must put such religious knowledge outside of "rational" conceptual knowledge and into its opposite: "irrational" mystical knowledge.

How is it that Dooyeweerd can resist this move? How can he claim that central religious knowledge is not something "opposite to, and independent of" conceptual knowledge while maintaining the importance of the distinction? Dooyeweerd's strategy is to reject the assumption that conceptual knowledge is something that we can make sense of as a self-standing and independent factor of our thinking and experience. His theory of the modal aspects makes this clear. Conceptual thinking is impossible without a multiplicity of distinguished elements brought together into a conceptual unity. This demonstrates the necessity of a basis in the numerical aspect of reality. There is further the logical extension of a concept pointing to the spatial aspect, the movement of thought, the relation of logical grounds to consequents, the life of thought resting on the functioning of the brain and logical representation based on our sensations. Any deepened sense of conceptual thought whereby the thinker can be said to have some rational control over the development and evaluation of their thinking and so can be held accountable involves the historical-formative aspect, the symbolic representation of thought points to the lingual aspect, the possibility to pursuade, to engage in dialogue, to evaluate requirements of the economy of thought, justification of reasons, while showing a proper concern for truth, each point beyond the merely logical-conceptual to all the other aspects of our experience. This integral coherence and multidimensional character of experience undermines the assumption that rational or conceptual knowledge can be taken as an independent sphere separated from the rest of our experience.

On Dooyeweerd's view the integral coherence that marks the multidimensional character of human experience finds it unity in the central religious root of the human heart. Now, sometimes, when people are first introduced to Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal spheres, and especially when the emphasis is laid on their irreducibility, there is a temptation to interpret his theory as involving a series of layers that sit on top of each other. It can then seem to be an important task to work out what sphere different things "belong" to in a way that makes the modal spheres appear to be separate and independent from each other. Such an interpretation can only end up transfoming Dooyeweerd's distinctions into a whole series of dialectical tensions! Exactly the kind of dialectical problems that his theory is designed to disolve are then interpreted back into his theory. It is essential then, for a correct understanding of Dooyeweerd, that we learn the lesson of the opening paragraph of the New Critique:

If I consider reality as it is given in the naive pre-theoretical experience, and then confront it with a theoretical analysis, through which reality appears to split up into various modal aspects then the first thing that strikes me, is the original indissoluble interrelation among these aspects which are for the first time explicitly distinguished in the theoretical attitude of mind. A indissoluble inner coherence binds the numerical to the spatial aspect, the latter to the aspect of mathematical movement, the aspect of movement to that of physical energy, which iself is the necessary basis of the aspect of organic life. The aspect of organic life has an inner connection with that of psychical feeling, the latter refers in its logical anticipation (the feeling of logical correctness or incorrectness) to the analytical-logical aspect. This in turn is connected with the historical, the linguistic, the aspect of social intercourse, the economic,the aesthetic,the jural,the moral aspects and that of faith. In this inter-modal cosmic coherence no single aspect stands by itself; everyone refers within and beyond itself to all the others. [emphasis in bold added]

We can now return to the first passage quoted above and give two reasons why his distinction between the central supra-conceptual sphere and the conceprtual sphere of knowledge avoids the pitfall of becoming a dialectical tension. The first is Dooyeweerd's account of the unity rooted in the human heart which undermines any sense in which rational thought could be considered as opposite to or cut off from central religious knowledge. Instead it is from out of the human heart that come the issues of life, which is to say that rational thought cannot be understood except in intimate connection with the central supra-conceptual sphere. Equally, Dooyeweerd claimed that the human heart, this central "I", is nothing in itself outside of its relation to God, other humans and the world, all of which are expressed through the diverse aspects including that of rational thought. The second is the way Dooyeweerd's theory of the modal spheres helps us see the incoherence of thinking of rational thought as something that could exist in itself, independent of the rest of human experience. In this way Dooyeweerd allows for a rich variety of distinctions to account for our living experience in the world without those distinctions becoming transformed into dialectical tensions.

Findings - A journal of reformational thought

The third issue of Findings has just come out and includes my review of Chris Watkin's Thinking Through Creation. The other contributions look well worth reading through. There is not an easy way to quickly view the contents of each issue, so I will provide links below to the first three issues.

Findings 1

Findings 2

Findings 3

Animals and Philosophy

I have a hunch that animals could be a really interesting and important challenge to any philosophical conception of reality. I mean a kind of "test case" for the validity of a philosophical position. How many philosophers have made room for animals in their philosophical reflections? Not many, or at least very few have given them serious consideration. When they have it has been in relation to questions of ethics. That is important. But what would a serious consideration of animals mean for areas like epistemology and ontology?

In his book on the message of the book of Job, A Battle for Righteousness, Klaas Popma devotes his final section to the animals and claims that it is here where we must find the solution to understanding the book. Here's a quote:

"Both wild and domesticated animals live their own lives in their domains which remain, for people, impenetrable. For those humans who consider themselves the most important of creatures, the instruction to look to the animal world for understanding God, is utterly humiliating. Animals who are, after all, our fellow creatures, by their own incomprehensibility, point to the incomprehensibility of God. Those who believe in the perspicuity of being only need to look at the animals to see how incredibly foolish that belief is. God has made all these animals and for no other reason than that it was His good pleasure to do so; for God always does what pleases Him. God created the animals because He took delight in doing so." (263)

His comment on the foolishness of the belief in the "perspicuity of being" is more than a hint of philosophical significance. Perhaps a worry we might have is that the very incomprehensibility of the animals is enough to set them aside in our attempts to throw light on the nature of reality from out of our philosophical thinking. Or, are we tempted by the thought that animals being part of the natural world - they don't have souls, or reason or whatever - any mystery regarding them is just a gap waiting for scientific elucidation. Hopefully any reformational philosophy would reject the second option. As for the first, even a reflection on the shape of such incomprehensibility, could prove beneficial in filling out our ontology and epistemology. Also, should we not say that incomprehensibility is not the full picture, there is also some knowledge as implied in Proverbs 12:10.

The second quote is from a long footnote in a paper originally given as a lecture and since turned into a book. This actually goes further and considers our response to plants and even human made artefacts. My claim is that if even plants can make some kind of demand on our (moral) consideration, then might it be worth considering what demand on our philosophical reflections the life of animals might make. The point at the end about how we should "treat every kind of thing in accordance with its nature" must also apply to philosophy as well as to more 'practical' pursuits.

Christine Korsgaard "Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals"

“Why shouldn’t the argument of this essay extend even further down the line of the different senses of “natural good” or “good for”? Our moral values spring from reflective endorsement of the natural good we are inclined to pursue as animals, but that natural good in turn depends on the sort of good to which plants are oriented, and that in turn to the general, functional capacity for having a good. Why shouldn’t we think that implicit in our endorsement of our own self-concern is a concern for the good of anything that has a good? At the risk of being thought a complete lunatic, let me admit that I am tempted by this thought. There is no reason to believe that “moral standing” is an on-off notion: perhaps it comes in degrees or kinds. We respond normatively to plants; a drooping plant in need of a drink seems to present us with a reason to water it; a sapling growing from what seems to be almost sheer rock makes us want to cheer it on. Is this because we cannot help animistically imagining that plant experiences its good? Is it because, as I say in the text, the line between plants and animals is unclear? Or is it perhaps because the shared condition of life itself elicits these responses? Or could it even be that we have duties, not only to our fellow creatures, but to our fellow entities? Granted, it sounds absurd to suggest that we might have duties to machines, yet still there is something in the far outer reaches of our normative thought and feeling that corresponds even to this. A general discomfort in the face of wanton destructiveness, a tendency to wince when objects are broken, an objection to the neglect or abuse of precision tools that isn’t rooted completely in the idea of economic waste… Again it might be suggested that such feelings result from a kind of animistic imagination, that we imagine that the tool feels the badness of being broken. But what is it that calls forth that animistic imagination, unless it is a distant form of respect for functional identity itself, a condition we share with all entities? I do not mention these possible consequences of my of argument in order to insist on them, but only to affirm that if someone thinks this follows I wouldn’t regard that as a reduction to absurdity. Perhaps we should treat every kind of thing in accordance with its nature, in accordance with the kinds of good and bads to which it is subject.” (p.33)

Dooyeweerd's warning against fascism and communism

A.R.J.A.

It is with ardent conviction that I acceded to the request of the board of A.R.J.A. to draw attention to the work of the Young Antirevolutionary Study Clubs.

There still is far too little awareness among us that our whole movement is caught up in the crucible of our great and anxious times which will reduce to ashes everything that does not survive that fiery trial.

There is also too little awareness among us that a task greater than ever before is waiting for us in the service of our King Christ Jesus to propagate our principles with deepened knowledge and true inspiration in a world where the spirit of darkness is at work.

It is alarming to see how in our own circles many young people and even older folk are swept along by fascist and communist currents, how many are spiritually uprooted and become an easy prey to the radical and demonic powers which since the world war have been threatening Europe with spiritual dissolution.

In the name of our God we must adjure our young people: 

Arm yourself with the full armour of faith and prayer, and deepen your knowledge for the political struggle that awaits you!

Do not think – for God’s sake, do not think for a moment – that we can just continue to live off the strengths that we have amassed in the past. Let the terror of the Lord enter our souls as we face the mighty signs of the times!

Young people! Remember your calling before it is too late.

Your place is with the young guard of study clubs who have realized that a spiritual standstill will mean our spiritual demise.

In our day, when such tremendously complicated questions are disturbing mankind, the intellectual equipment of those who went before you no longer suffices.

The propaganda of unbelief, the spirit of revolution – they are today armed with weapons that are extremely dangerous to all who do not know their effect and are not familiar with their toxic subtleties.

Against these only prayer avails, and a faith which glows with zeal for the cause of the Lord, but which will then irresistibly drive you on to whet the weapons with which you will soon wage the warfare of your principles.

H. Dooyeweerd  

column in De Standaard  

Tues, 29 Nov. 1932  

[4 months before Hitler’s coup] 

Translated by Harry van Dyke 

The Laymen's Lounge

Jason Estopinal is posting some great stuff over at his website The Laymen's Lounge.

As part of a series on "You should know about ..." the most recent is an excellent introduction to Herman Dooyeweerd by Steve Bishop and Gregory Baus.

Steve Bishop has also contributed another on Dirk Vollenhoven and one on Neo-Calvinism.

I have even got in on the act with a piece on sphere sovereignty.

So dig in and enjoy.

Further Reading

The sections 15-19 introduce the basic of the theory of the modal spheres. Dooyeweerd gives his fullest account of this theory in part I of the second volume of his New Critique (pp.3-426). Calvin Seerveld gives a helpful overview of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory in “Dooyeweerd’s legacy for aesthetics: Modal law theory” in The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd edited C.T. McIntire 1985 pp.41-79. Two other articles worth reading are D M F Strauss “The best known but least understood part of Dooyeweerd's philosophy” in Journal for Christian Scholarship 42 (2006): 61-80, and H G Geertsema “Analytical and Reformational Philosophy: Critical reflections regarding R. van Woudenberg’s meditation on ‘Aspects’ and ‘Functions’” Philosophia Reformata 69 (2004): 53-76. Most introductions to reformational philosophy will contain a section on the theory of the modal spheres, however for these sections I found Jonathan Chaplin’s discussion in Herman Dooyeweerd: Christian philosopher of state and civil society 2011, pp.55-61 particularly helpful. See also Hendrik Hart Understanding our World: An Integral Ontology (1984, University Press of America) chapter 4 particularly pp.190-198. For the historical  details concerning the development of the theory in Dooyeweerd see R.D. Henderson Illuminating Law: The construction of Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophy 1918-1928 and Marcel E Verburg Herman Dooyeweerd: the life and work of a Christian philosopher, for Vollenhoven see John H. Kok “Social spheres and law spheres” in Philosophy as Responsibility edited by Ronald Kuipers, also Anthony Tol Philosophy in the making: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven and the emergence of reformed philosophy. Dirk Stafleu’s development of modal theory in terms of relation frames is explained in his The Open Future [http://www.mdstafleu.nl/427446844] as well as many other books and papers that can be found at www.mdstafleu.nl. §20 on time draws on Andre Troost (2012:123-125).

The discussion of sensory perception (§24) is largely based on Dooyeweerd’s analysis in NC II 370-374 and Encyclopedia of the Science of Law Vol. 1 185-195 (referred to in the text as ESL, I). Henk Geertsema gives a very helpful analysis of Dooyeweerd’s views in “Dooyeweerd on Knowledge and Truth” in Ways of Knowing Dordt Press, 2005 edited John H. Kok. The quote from J J Smart (§25) comes from his paper ‘Sensations and brain states’ Philosophical Review, vol.68 (Smart 1964). This explanation of the difference and connection between modal aspects and entities is based on Dooyeweerd ESL, I 204-206.

The definition of idionomy at the start of §26 is taken from Ouweneel 2014a 87.  The examples and claims of §27 concerning animals were based on Stafleu “Being human in the cosmos” Philosophia Reformata 56:2 (1991) pp.101-131. For the contrast between animals and humans use was also made of some examples of Antheunis Janse kindly supplied by Chris Gousmett. The discussion of encapsis in §28 draws heavily on Ouweneel 2014a 88-90.

Klapwijk’s example of a lie detector (§17) can be found in his Purpose in the living world? Creation and emergent evolution Cambridge, 2008 p. 126. This links with the later discussion in §30. A very important article for understanding a reformational approach to many of these issues is Henk Geertsema “Embodied Freedom” Koers Vol. 71, no.1 (2011): 33-58. Examples and quotes from Selim Berker “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, no. 4 (2004): 293–329

The discussion of philosophical anthropology draws from a number of sources. The main ones being:

Dooyeweerd, Herman (1942) “De leer van de mensch in der Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee” translated as “The theory of Man: Thirty two propositions on anthropology”. Gerrit Glas (2010) “Christian Philosophical Anthropology” Philosophia Reformata 75:2, 141-189. Ouweneel, Willem J. (2014) “A Christian Anthropology” chapter 6 in Wisdom for Thinkers. Stafleu, Dirk (1991) “Being Human in the Cosmos” Philosophia Reformata 56:2 101-131. Strauss, D M F (2014) “Soul and Body: Transcending the dialectical intellectual legacy of the West with an integral biblical view?” In die Skriflig 48(1), Art. #1815. The example on the thyroid gland comes from Strauss with addition on hypothyroidism from David Hanson. The views expressed in §34 were considerably influenced by B J van der Walt’s At Home in God’s World Section C on “A multidimensional Christian view of being human” as well as Cornelis Vonk’s The Dead Know Nothing translated by Gerrit L Wassink (Alken Press, 1998). The quote from J.P Moreland & William Lane Craig can be found on page 288 of their Philosophical Foundation for a Christian Worldview (IVP, 2003). The reference to John Cooper is to his very valuable discussion of the biblical material in Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical anthropology and the Monism-Dualism debate (Eerdmans, 2000 2^nd edition) which defends substance dualism. The discussion of first person, second person and third person perspectives draws on Henk Geertsema’s work in particular “Creation Order in the Light of Redemption (1): Natural Science and Theology” in The Future of Creation Order Vol. 1 edited by Gerrit Glas (Springer, 2018) .

The section on faith and religion (§ 35) draws more on Vollenhoven than Dooyeweerd see John Kok “Vollenhoven and ‘Scriptural Philosophy” PR 1988 53:2 and Vollenhoven “Faith”. Interestingly the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas makes some remarks in his work Totality and Infinity that confirm Vollenhoven’s notion of the transcosmic relation. See the section on “Creation” in the conclusions which begin with the sentence “Theology imprudently treats the idea of the relation between God and the creature in terms of ontology.” (293). On theology (§ 36) see Willem J, Ouweneel’s What then is Theology? An introduction to Christian Theology Paideia Press 2014 and Renato Coletto “Encyclopaedic models in the Kuyperian tradition (Part 3: towards a network-model)” Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap 2012: pp.43-63. §37 draws on Hendrik Hart Understand our World pp.318-324, Danie Strauss Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines pp.188-205, and Henk Geertsema “Wolterstorff and the philosophy of religion. About being and creation” in Essays in honour of Nicholas P. Wolterstorff. Edited by Henk E.S. Woldring. VU University Press 2008, 51-60. The discussion of the Euthyphro dilemma is indebted to Roy Clouser who has written incisively on this topic on the Thinknet discussion list.

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