In 1985
Arvin Vos published a book called Aquinas, Calvin and contemporary protestant
thought: A critique of protestant views on the thought of Thomas Aquinas. In
this book he engaged the then common critical views of protestants against
Thomas Aquinas as a scholastic who stood for everything the reformation had
rejected. Vos argued that Calvin and Aquinas are actually much closer in their
views on many of the key issues than generally thought and that the criticism
of Aquinas in protestant circles was a result of misreading.
Recently two
books have been published which share similar concerns to Vos: Aquinas Among
the Protestants, Edited by Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen and J.V.
Fesko Reforming Apologetics: Retrieving the Classic Reformed Approach to
Defending the Faith. Each contain a chapter that ostensibly engage the
thought of the Dutch Christian philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd. In this and a
second post I aim to show that the harsh criticism and serious misreading that has
sometimes been characteristic of protestant understandings of Aquinas are here
mirrored and amplified against Dooyeweerd.
This first
post focuses on Chapter 7 of Fesko’s book entitled “Dualism” and has the very
modest aim of showing that Fesko’s repeated charges that Dooyeweerd is guilty of
failing to read the primary sources is ironically based on a quite spectacular
failing to read Dooyeweerd. What this means is that in the following I make no attempt
to give an account of Dooyeweerd’s thought since Fesko at no point demonstrates
that he has any idea of what Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is about. Instead I just
go through each claim Fesko makes and follow up his reference to show that
Dooyeweerd never says anything like what Fesko claims he says. The second post
will look at John Bolt’s chapter in Aquinas Among the Protestants and
show that his most fundamental claims about Dooyeweerd involve a serious
misreading that can be contradicted by many of Dooyeweerd’s statements as well
as the whole tenor and purpose of his thought.
The context
of Fesko’s chapter is broader than Dooyeweerd and begins with an overview of criticisms
of dualism found in Cornelius Van Til and Howard Van Til. The focus in what
follows however is the discussion of Dooyeweerd. The main criticism, and one repeated frequently,
is that Dooyeweerd fails to substantiate his criticism of dualisms with
documentation from the primary sources. As such “this chapter argues that the
dualism critique rests on an inaccurate evaluation of the historical evidence”
(p.164). Given the centrality of such a critique it is incumbent on Fesko to
ensure that his own criticism of Dooyeweerd is properly documented and shows a
careful analysis of the appropriate evidence. In what follows I aim to show
that sadly this is not the case and that Dooyeweerd deserves a second hearing.
There are
six places where Fesko explicitly claims that in their criticisms of dualism
Dooyeweerd and his heirs fail to engage properly with the primary sources (pp.
164 (twice), 177, 184, 191 & 197). To give just two examples: “This
caricature has largely arisen from a failure to read primary sources” (164) and
“he [Dooyeweerd] rarely, if ever, supports his claims with primary-source
documentation” (177). There are a further five places where much the same point
is made though in different language (pp. 175, 179, 180-181, 187 & 190) as
an example “Dooyeweerd has constructed a mythological strawman” (p. 175).
The
insistent and repetitive nature of these claims about Dooyeweerd are very serious
and it is difficult to imagine someone coming across Dooyeweerd for the first
time in Fesko’s chapter thinking that he might be worthy of consideration.
To aid the
readers own evaluation I list below the primary sources Fesko cites for
Dooyeweerd. Most are accessible in PDF here.
A New
Critique of Theoretical Thought (NC) 3:784
(p.168) 3:89 (p.169 &170) 2:564, 2:593 (p.169), 1:8-11 (p182), 2:564
(p.182)
In the
Twilight of Western Thought (1999 edition) (TWT) 86(-87)
(p.170, p.172 twice), 32-33 (p.170), 96-97 (p.171), 31-35, 47-48, 81-82, 96-97
(p.177), 116 (p.177), 38, 64, 108 (p.179)
Reformation
and Scholasticism in Philosophy (RS) 1:36-37
(171) 1:38 (twice p.171, 176, 179), 1:15 (p.177), 1:326-327 (179), 2:90 (179)
“Kuyper’s
Wetenschapsleer” pp.193-232 (p.171)
“Cornelius
Van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought” 74-88, 75, 86
(p.172)
“Centrum en
Omtrek: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in een veranderende wereld” “as quoted in
Friesen Neo-Calvinism, 388” (p.173)
While this might
give the impression of a serious engagement with Dooyeweerd’s works we will
soon discover that every reference fails to substantiate Fesko’s claims and
some cover topics so removed from the concerns of Fesko’s chapter that it is a mystery
why they have been included.
Fesko opens
his discussion of Dooyeweerd with a brief account of the fundamentals of
Dooyeweerd’s thought. The main source he relies on is J. Glenn Friesen’s Neo-Calvinism
and Christian Theosophy: Franz von Baader, Abraham Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd. While
it may be likely that this book plays a role in some of the misinterpretations
of Dooyeweerd in this section I will pass over them. This is because my focus is
on the primary sources. We turn then to consider Fesko’s reading of Dooyeweerd
and the sources he cites in support. I have focused on five claims Fesko makes
and the references he supplies to support them and finish with two occasions where
the references provided are something of a mystery while also indicting a
missed opportunity.
(1) “Once
fallen human beings realize their need for Christ, they transcend the temporal
earthly cosmos and participate in the transcendental root of the cosmos” (p.169
reference to NC 2:593)
The most
likely sentence that relates to this is the following: “Man, in his full
selfhood, transcends the temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos in all its aspects, and
partakes in the transcendental root of this cosmos.”
Fesko’s
analysis suggests that it is only “once” we realize our need for Christ, and so
only “they” who have this realisation that come to participate in this root. Dooyeweerd’s text however does not refer to Christ or a sense of need, nor does
he limit his point to a particular group, it is part of the nature and
structure of man to transcend the temporal cosmos. My purpose is not to go into
what this could mean, or whether Dooyeweerd is correct, but just to illustrate
the difference between Fesko’s interpretation and what the source actually
says.
(2) In the
next quote I will number the claims that Fesko believes that Dooyeweerd makes:
“In Dooyeweerd’s analysis, [1] the Greek philosophical failure to recognize the
supratemporal origin of the human heart [2] leads to the absolutizing the
temporal and [3] thus creates an antithetical relationship between soul and
body. [4] Scholastic theologians inherited the same problem because [5] they
adopted the Greek philosophical anthropology.” (reference TWT, 32-33). None of
these claims can be found in the text referenced. It nowhere speaks of a
“failure to recognize the supratemporal origin of the human heart” [1], on these
pages there is no discussion of the body and soul and so no claim about
creating an antithetical relationship between the two [3], there is therefore
no “same problem” for theologians to inherit [4] and no discussion of Greek
anthropology [5]. That leaves the point about “absolutizing the temporal” [2].
What we do find in the next section discussing the humanistic nature-freedom
motive is the claim that humanism, in the Italian Renaissance, looked for a new
personality and rebirth of man where “this personality was thought of as
absolute in itself” (TWT, 33), it is difficult to see how this fits the
description given by Fesko.
(3) “The
nature-grace dualism established a beachhead within Calvinistic thought and
subsequently expressed itself in the polarities that were “characteristic of
Lutheranism.” “The Lutheran dualism of law and gospel,” writes Dooyeweerd, “is
foreign to the Reformed confession.” Reformed scholasticism tries to build its
doctrinal cathedral on the sand of Aquinas’s nature-grace dualism and hence has
the same foundational weaknesses.” (p. 171 Reference to RS 1:38)
This is the
closest we get to Fesko giving a close reading of Dooyeweerd’s text. It is
worth quoting Dooyeweerd a bit more extensively to see how accurately Fesko has
interpreted the text:
“To the extent that the ground-motive of
nature and grace is able to establish a beachhead in Calvinistic thought, it
will never express itself in a theological way in terms of the polarity
characteristic of Lutheranism. The Lutheran dualism of law and gospel is
foreign to the Reformed confession.” RS 1:38 A little
further on: Reformed Scholasticism rejects “both the Lutheran dualism between
nature and grace and the Thomistic substructure-superstructure theme.” RS 1:38
While Fesko
seems to present the nature-grace dualism as something Dooyeweerd finds in
Aquinas, that then becomes established in Calvinism and subsequently expressed
in Lutheranism, what Dooyeweerd actual writes shows a more complex
understanding of the nature-grace ground motive. We see in this short passage
that Dooyeweerd contrasts Reformed Scholasticism with Thomism at several
points. At one point he writes that Reformed Scholasticism “has never been able
to elaborate an independent philosophy like that of Thomism”. He goes on to say
that “In Reformed Scholasticism, nature can never be conceived of as the
antipode of grace or as its relatively autonomous substructure. For, in
conformity to Augustine, Reformed Scholasticism always binds the natural light
of reason to the light of Scripture.” This is quite different from the picture
Fesko paints. However it must be said that in this short section of
Dooyeweerd’s text it is true that there is a lack of reference to primary
texts. Does this validate Fesko’s criticism that Dooyeweerd does not properly
engage the primary texts? We could perhaps try to excuse Dooyeweerd by saying
that here we are only dealing with a brief survey of issues before getting into
the main text which gives almost 300 pages (pp.41-323) of very detailed analysis
of Greek philosophy leading up to and including Plato including many citations
from the Greek texts.
Nevertheless
this doesn’t solve the problem that his discussion of Luther lacks any
documentation. Later though, on page 179, Fesko references RS 1:326-327, here
Dooyeweerd does provide documentation from Luther’s work and responds to just
the kind of criticism Fesko offers, it is a shame then that he does not engage
Dooyeweerd’s discussion either at page 171 or later when he includes this
reference.
(4) On page
176 Fesko writes that Dooyeweerd “fails to recognize that the Reformed
theologians who came later rejected the nature-grace construct”. He again
references RS 1:38 where we have already seen Dooyeweerd acknowledge
significant differences between reformed scholasticism and Aquinas. It would
seem that Fesko thinks Dooyeweerd identifies the nature-grace ground motive
with Aquinas’s thought in such a way that anyone who shows evidence of a
nature-grace ground motive must be saying the same things as Aquinas. A careful
reading of even the few references that Fesko provides shows that this is not
how Dooyeweerd understands the nature-grace ground motive.
(5) Fesko
points out that Calvin himself expressed views that Dooyeweerd is said to
criticise as scholastic and then writes “nevertheless, Dooyeweerd still calls
Calvin’s theology “pure”” (p.178). Fesko provides no evidence for this claim
and in none of the citations he provides throughout this chapter do we find
Dooyeweerd making such a claim. I think that it is highly unlikely that Dooyeweerd
did write such a thing. He certainly shows an appreciation of important
elements in Calvin and believed his philosophy to be an outworking of the
reformational spirit found especially in Calvin’s works, but this does not
exclude the possibility that he would be critical of other elements in Calvin’s
thought. In his brief discussion of Dooyeweerd and Calvin (pp.178-179) there
are no citations of Dooyeweerd and it would be possible to show that Dooyeweerd
is not presented in a very accurate way.
(6) In the
section on “Criticisms against So-Called Dualisms” Fesko quotes Dooyeweerd on
the Westminster Confessions to the effect that it was influenced by the
Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysics (p.179). In the footnote (n.88) Fesko
references 3 separate pages from TWT, the two short sections from RS 1 we have
already discussed, and a page from RS 2. From TWT he references pages 38, 64
and 108. The quote itself is found on TWT 108, TWT 64 contains a discussion of
Dooyeweerd’s understanding of cultural formation with a brief criticism of
historicism and doesn’t appear to have any connection with the points at issue.
The first reference however has much value in the broader context of Fesko’s
book if not with the role, or lack, of Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysics in
the Westminster Confessions. I quote the follow passage:
“Structural
data, founded in the temporal order of human experience, however, are facts of
a transcendental significance, which should be acknowledged, irrespective of
their philosophical interpretation. If these data seem not to agree with
certain dogmatical presuppositions of a philosophical school, the adherents of
the latter should not try to eliminate the data, but to find a satisfactory
philosophical explanation upon the basis of their own starting-point. Every
philosophical current may contribute to the testing of its own and other
philosophical views with respect to data which, up to now, have been neglected.
For the discovery of this neglected state of affairs in our experiential horizon
is not the monopoly of a particular philosophical school. Thanks to common
grace, relative truths are to be found in every philosophy, although the
interpretation of such truths may appear to be unacceptable from the biblical
standpoint insofar as the philosophical interpretation turns out to be ruled by
a dialectical and apostate basic-motive. However, no philosophy can prosper in
isolation.” TWT 38
Fesko will
say in the next few sentences after this reference that Dooyeweerd rejects
common grace as imposing a dualism on creation, yet here we have Dooyeweerd
giving a positive articulation of common grace, it also deals with the very
issues that Fesko is discussing throughout his book. There is material there in
Dooyeweerd, seemingly right under his nose, that Fesko could have fruitfully
engaged with. We can only hope that he
gets a second hearing.
(7) Finally
there is an intriguing reference in the same footnote (p.179n88) to volume 2 of
Dooyeweerd’s Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, this is the volume
that gives well over 200 pages of discussion to the philosophy of Thomas
Aquinas (pp.140-180, 246-434). We also find a more extensive discussion of
reformed scholasticism here than found in volume 1 which Fesko has discussed.
What then do we find when reading RS 2:90? This single reference to volume 2 is
a bit of a mystery as that page is part of a discussion of Kuyper’s concept of
sphere-sovereignty and does not touch on any of the issues raised in Fesko’s
chapter! Once again, the relevant material is there to be discussed, there are
plenty of references to the Summa Theologiae and Summa contra
gentiles, alongside other works of Aquinas, there is a good deal of Latin. Instead of spending much of the chapter complaining that Dooyeweerd fails to engage the primary sources Fesko should have got stuck in, engaged Dooyeweerd's text and shown us how a competent reformed Thomist might evaluate Dooyeweerd's thought. An opportunity missed.
